UN Geneva - Multimedia Newsroom : United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) - Press Conference: Cluster Munitions Monitor 2024

Ladies and gentlemen

Good afternoon.

On behalf of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

in collaboration

with International Campaign

to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munitions Coalition,

I want to welcome you all to this afternoon Global launch

of the Cluster Munition Monitor 2024 Report

My name is Fifi Edo

and I'm a senior researcher

for UN IE

Conventional Arms and Ammunitions programme.

It's an honour to chair this year's lunch event

on behalf of Unida.

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

is pleased to have enjoyed long and close collaboration

with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines

and Cluster Munition Coalition over the years,

hosting numerous launches of respective campaign launches

and annual landmine monitor and cluster

munition monitor reports.

Cluster munitions are weapons that are delivered from aircraft

or fired in artillery, rockets,

missiles and mortars.

They open into the air to despair dozens

and sometimes hundreds of submunitions over a wide area.

Their impact can be devastating

and when used in populated areas,

can be very devastating.

Moreover,

many submissions fail to detonate

as designed

and pose existential threats

long after the conflict had ended.

Adopted

16 years ago

in May 2008

The Convention on Cluster Munitions is currently in good standing

with 100 and 12 state parties.

UN.

Retreats

The UN Secretary General's 4th April 2004 call for countries

that have not yet

joined or fully implemented. The convention.

Cluster Munition Monitor 2024

is the 15th annual report of the Cluster Munition Coalition.

It tracks

efforts to eradicate cluster munitions

by all countries, regardless of whether they have joined the convention.

The report is based on independent

and impartial research.

Cluster Munition Monitor 2024

shows how once again civilians are primary victims

of cluster munitions

at both the time of attack

and afterwards from remnants.

The report also documents how non

banning cluster munitions is at risk of being undermined,

including by new use, production

and transfer of states. Outside the convention

this week,

the C, MC and UN I

would attend the 12 meeting of state parties

to the Convention on Cluster Munitions under the presidency of Mexico.

This meeting offers a timely opportunity

to express grave concerns over humanitarian impacts

resulting from repeated and well documented use

of cluster munitions in recent years,

particularly in Ukraine.

I will now hand over

to four distinguished civil society experts who

have been centrally involved in producing this year's

monetary reports.

First, we have

Mary

Wilham Deputy Crisis Conflict,

an arms director at Human Rights Watch

who established the Landmine Monitor Initiative in 1998.

She will present a report findings relating to new use, production

and transfer, as well as progress in stockpile destruction.

Second Speaker

is Catherine Atkins,

editor for reporting on Mine Action

and trained the mining experts.

Catherine would present highlights

from the monitor's reporting on class

ammunition contamination and efforts to reduce

that impact through clearance and risk education.

Third Speaker will be Lauren

Percy

Landmine and Cluster Munitions Monitor Impacts Team lead.

Lauren

has edited

the Casualty and Victims Assistance Session of every

Cluster Munition Monitor report since its inception.

In 2010,

Laurie will present a report Findings relating

to the human impact of cluster munitions,

including cluster munitions casualties

and victim assistance.

Finally, we have Charles

Chera, communication and media manager at the Cluster Munitions Coalition.

Charles will briefly go over the main

resources and materials and expectations for conventional

meetings for for the conventions meeting of

state parties starting tomorrow in Geneva.

I think Charles will be taking the

first.

Uh,

And then I also want to acknowledge in the room the presence of

Tama

Ganek, director of Geneva based International Campaign to Ban Landmines

and also

Cluster Munition Coalition and

Burrow,

project manager for the Monitor.

They will stand by to answer any further questions as we come up.

So, Charles, you have the floor.

Thank you.

Thank you all for being here today. As, uh, Doctor Eduardo

mentioned. This is the 15th annual Monitor report.

The report covers the calendar year of

2023 with additional information included Where possible,

Up to August 2024.

Physical copies of the report are available at the front of the room

and,

uh, the online version can be accessed as well

via the link on our presentation.

The report is now available on the monitor's new website,

which we launched earlier this year.

The website has been redesigned to make accessing information

much more user friendly and easy for everyone, including journalists.

As you log in to the page

of the monitor report, you'll be able to see

the maps and other tools that you find useful for your reporting at

the same time,

individual country profiles providing detailed accounts and specific findings

related to the different topics covered in the report

now can be accessed directly from the landing page of the website

and we are still in the process of uploading these country profiles

as we speak.

I would like to extend our gratitude to

the continued financial support from government funders

whose names are displayed on the screen.

And at the same time,

I would like also to note that this is not

the only news on cluster munitions for this week.

There will be further developments

during the Convention on Cluster Munitions Meeting of States parties,

which is scheduled to start tomorrow and continue until Friday.

Therefore,

I invite you to cover all the major events

and developments that will come out from these meetings,

especially Lithuania's decision

to withdraw from the convention.

The Cluster Munition Coalition will be organising a panel

discussion during these meetings on Thursday at 10 a.m.

during which we will revisit the humanitarian

consequences of cluster munitions and their technical failures

which led to their prohibition in 2008.

Lastly, please keep an eye out for our sister publication,

the landmine Monitor report

scheduled for release on November 20th

2024

just a few days before the Mine Ban Treaty Review conference in Cambodia.

Thank you, and I will now pass it over to Mary. We

thank you very much.

Giles,

as Dr

I

Ail from UN,

noted the Convention on Class Dimunition is in good standing,

with 112 countries that are party to it and another

12 countries that have signed but not yet ratified.

Uh, we do, however,

note that there has been little progress towards new

countries joining the convention over the last year.

This last country to to join was South Sudan in August of 2023.

There have been very few steps to join by some

of the major countries that remain outside of the convention,

such as the United States, China

and Russia.

That's a shame,

because the Convention on Cluster Munitions

provides a vital framework for ending the

immediate and the long term harm and suffering caused by these abhorrent weapons.

We urge all countries to join the convention if they're serious about

protecting civilians from these weapons in the face of rising conflict.

We are deeply dismayed by the formal withdrawal from the convention by Lithuania,

which deposited its instrument of withdrawal of the United Nations on Friday.

And it will now take six months for that to go

into effect unless Lithuania suspends the process and revisits the decision,

which is what the Class Dimunition coalition urges Lithuania to do.

This is a stain on Lithuania's otherwise excellent reputation

and humanitarian disarmament, and it ignores the ah, the risk to civilians.

The class dimunition Monitor report details uh continued

use of class diminutions in three countries in

Ukraine by Russian forces as well as by

Ukrainian forces throughout 2023 and into this year.

Up until this very day,

new use of cluster munitions has also been recorded in Syria,

where cluster munitions have been used repeatedly for more

than a decade since 2012 by government forces.

And there's also new use of Class di munitions in Myanmar.

It's important for us to note that there are no reports or allegations

of any use of class dimunition by any state party to the Convention

on Class Dimunition, and that has been the case since the convention was adopted.

18 countries have ceased production, uh,

as a result of joining the Convention on Cluster munitions.

Uh, with one exception, Argentina, which still has not signed

yet.

17 countries still produce these weapons or reserve the right to do so,

and none of them are states parties to the convention.

Over the course of the last year,

we decided to add Myanmar to the list of countries who produce cluster munitions.

And that's after uh

after research showed that Kasa

Industries, the Myanmar State

industry production facility,

has been making a rudimentary cluster munition that has dropped from the

air and it has been using these in attacks around the country.

Myanmar's mission to the UN did not deny those attacks,

but denied that the weapon is indeed a cluster munition.

We have a separate slide this year on

transfer of Class di munitions because unfortunately,

transfers are on the rise.

Between July of last year and April of this year,

the United States approved five transfers of class dimunition to Ukraine.

The types of class di munitions are delivered by artillery projectiles

and by ballistic missiles.

We a RT a German media outlet. Uh, last month, uh,

detailed how some of the US class diminish have been pulled off a US base in Germany

and have been transited through Germany

and Poland and on to Ukraine.

This raises serious questions under the prohibition on

assistance in the Convention on Class Di Munitions,

which prohibits any assistance with banned activities.

Ukraine might have also acquired cluster munitions

from other countries in the reporting period.

But that's quite hard to track because those

countries have been denying the transfer of cluster munitions

the last point. I want point that I wanted to make concerns stockpile distraction.

All of the state parties that are members of

the Convention on Class Dimunition have now completed the destruction

of their stockpiles. Uh,

and that means nearly 1.5 million,

uh, class di munitions have been destroyed and nearly 100 and 79

million submunitions

uh, Peru delivered this result in December.

Uh, when it, uh

when it completed the distraction of its stockpile.

And also last September, we heard from Bulgaria, Slovakia and South Africa,

who had also destroyed their stocks of class dimunition.

Does this mean that all stocks of

class dimunition held worldwide have been destroyed?

Absolutely not.

The United States, Russia, China continued to

stockpile class dimunition and to and in the

case of the United States to transfer them

to Ukraine.

So there is still work to be done

to ensure that this convention reaches its full potential

in protecting civilians and and and stemming

the human suffering caused by cluster munitions.

Thank you,

Thank you.

I'm going to briefly talk about contamination and also the

response to contamination of land release clearance and risk education.

There is not a lot of change in terms of contaminated countries and

contaminated state parties. We record 27 states or other areas this year

which are suspected or confirmed to be contaminated.

Last year we recorded 29.

The changes are that we could remove Bosnia and Herzegovina from the list,

which is great news.

So they completed clearance in August 2023.

We added south Sudan, which was known to be contaminated before.

But as it is now a state party member, it's one of them

10 state parties to be known to be contaminated.

We also took the decision to add Kuwait to the list of contaminated countries,

although we do not know the extent of the contamination.

But we have several reports of cluster munition

found predominantly during survey of oil fields.

So we decided to add it to the list,

maybe one word to Myanmar.

It is not on the list of contaminated

countries because we have reports from attacks.

We have reports of casualties which are

casualties from attacks,

but we do not have sufficient evidence of actual contamination on the ground.

But

we are closely observing that and are going to add

Myanmar to the list as soon as we have any evidence

in terms of the extent of contamination.

Lao remains at the top of the list with a massive contamination of more than 1000

square kilometres

of the non state parties.

Vietnam is also on top of the list

in the same category with the massive contamination

largely contaminated between 100,000 square kilometres remain Iraq,

which is a state party

and also Cambodia, which is not a state party.

As of the end of last year,

five states had quite a clear understanding of their contamination.

This includes um

this includes Germany. It includes also Iraq.

Uh, it includes Lebanon

and uh,

the states that have a less clear understanding

of their contamination or as an example,

Lao

PPDR in Mauritania, a

survey is still going on in both countries and particularly in Laos.

This is a is a huge task as the contamination is also,

um extensive and big.

So with Bosnia and Herzegovina who we could add

to the list of countries that have completed clearance.

We have now in total,

11 state parties that have completed their clearance obligations

between 2008

and 2023.

Before Bosnia Herzegovina last year,

the last two state parties to complete clearance were Croatia and Montenegro.

In 2020.

Moving on to clearance,

we had eight of the

10 state parties that reported clearance. In 2023

we had at least

83.91 square kilometres and over 70,000 submunitions destroyed.

This is less clearance than we had last year.

The reasons for less clearance conducted are predominantly degrees of funding,

but also increasingly difficult terror to access, particularly in Lebanon.

This is the main concern of them that all the

remaining areas that have to be cleared are in difficult terror

which

are simply difficult to access, but also in terms of methodology to be used to clear

there are some challenges.

Iraq, Lebanon, Bosnia Herzegovina and south Sudan also reported

other methodologies applied,

so not only clearance but also release of

land through non technical survey and technical survey,

which we will call cancelled land or reduced land.

And I would like to emphasise that this is an equally important,

an equally important success than clearance because

it helps us to reduce contaminated land through

the most efficient methodology.

Somalia and south Sudan are the only state parties

which still work towards their original clearance deadline,

so south Sudan obviously just joined.

They have 10 years to go to complete clearance.

Somalia has a bit less left, seems to be on track.

But we have to say that Somalia did not really fulfil

its reporting obligations.

It usually comes late or we do not receive an update,

so we do not really know what's going on in Somalia.

In early 2024 3 state parties requested an extension of their Article four deadline

chart,

requested an extension until 2024

Germany and Lao P

both until 2030. So for Germany and Laos, this means a five year extension

for chart it is a two year extension.

Char will use this extension to survey the remaining area in TIBE,

which they suspect to be contaminated.

Germany hopefully will finish its clearance until 2030. They

know very well what they have to do. It's just a matter of getting it done.

And in Lao

it's a bit a mix. So further surveys going on,

they have good clearance rates.

But we also all know that with this massive contamination it will take

them longer and we expect them to hand in further extension requests beyond

2030

uh, next slide. Please

risk education all contaminated state parties.

So all 10 reported conducting risk education in 2023 for cluster munition,

but also for other ammunition.

So this is usually combined risk education,

which includes all explosive ordnance threats present.

Chile and Germany did not report any risk education as in previous years,

because the contaminated area in both countries is

on military ground, which is not accessible to the public.

It's fenced, it's marked, but they do not conduct any risk education there

not a lot of changes in terms of who are the main groups at risk.

Men remain the main groups at risk the high risk group,

predominantly due to due to their Parti participation

in activities that take them into contaminated areas.

So this includes farmers, herds, herders, shepherds

but also, um, in in general nomadic communities, refugees and ID PS,

which do, of course, not only consist of men,

but, um, they simply remain the main group at risk.

Children represented the largest groups of beneficiaries,

as in previous years as well.

So in 2023 we had 66% of Children who benefited from risk education.

This is 14% more than the previous year. But we have to say this is also due a large

data set we received from UN

for last year.

And UNICEF has been focusing on educating Children on the risk

most state parties. When it comes to educating Children.

They focused on boys, as they are known to be more

have a high risk appetite than girls. Only child

educated, more girls than boys.

But in all other state parties that focused on Children,

boys were the highest group targeted.

That's it from my end. Thank you,

Lauren. Over to you.

Thank you.

Um, I'd like to continue with some updates on the situation

of casualties of class admissions and also

victim assistance

to, um,

the casualties, their families and communities

Significantly,

This was the second year in a row where

Ukraine had

recorded the highest number

of annual class

mission casualties in the world.

And this This marks a

significant change

from a decade

of Syria

having

the by far the highest number of cluster emission casualties.

It's a very unfortunate

two years since the full invasion

of Ukraine by Russia,

and

many

things concerning the impact of cost emissions

for the annual statistics for 2023 have remained

pertinent

throughout the period of the Convention on Cluster Musicians.

So

93% of the casualties recorded were civilians

and

just under half

of the casualties of the unexploited sub

emissions. The clued

emission remnants that remain

as we just heard, sometimes for decades after their use,

um were Children

Children being attracted

to the remnants or otherwise finding them

as we heard in situation of risk and risk education.

Now

the number of casualties recorded,

uh, was significantly,

um, less

in 2023 than in 2022.

there's

some various factors

uh, for that, And it doesn't necessarily mean

that there was

so much, uh, fewer casualties and certainly fewer less impact.

it may be the case that many casualties went unreported

because of the nature of conflicts changing, including the conflict in Ukraine.

And

it's

also the case that there are very, really very few,

although the number of casualties may remain unknown for years.

And this was the situation with Syria

that Syria had the highest number of casualties from

2012 to 2021.

But the casualties from 2012 through 2015

2016 were only really reported years later,

and and and that may well be the case again.

As I mentioned with the impact,

there are very few unknowns when it comes to who suffers most.

It is civilians and Children,

interacting with unexploded sub

sub

music

and this use of cluster

Ms creates really a vicious cycle

in the sense that

it's often when there is a lull in fighting or a peace,

or people are able to return to land that was affected by conflict and class

use

that

people come into contact with

unexploded

submunitions

and we see an increase in casualties.

So

the

this change this decrease between 2022 and 2023

unfortunately

may not really mean

fewer people will suffer because of the use in this period.

And we also note that there were many classes

attacks

just in Ukraine

where no casualties were recorded for them. But

there there may have been casualties that occurred.

So casualties overall globally occurred in nine countries that was Azerbaijan,

Iraq,

Lao PDR,

Lebanon,

Mauritania, Myanmar,

Syria again, Ukraine and Yemen

and all of those countries except Myanmar. As Katrine had mentioned

where no

evidence so far of clusters

remnants has been found explosive remnants.

So all of the other countries except Myanmar had casualties of clusters,

remnants

and

casualties from class.

The attacks were only recorded in

Myanmar, Syria and Ukraine as mere

had mentioned those attacks.

Uh, just

move on to

the situation of addressing

the impact on victims.

So

victim assistance, which is a

obligation of the Convention on class missions and it

really holds a higher standard of victim assistance,

um

has

being undertaken,

uh,

very generously supported by donors in many

cases and including by states themselves.

However,

the level of assistance is just not matching

the needs of custom

victims

in almost any state.

And in

some countries specifically

standing out, are Afghanistan and Lebanon.

The economic and, um,

other conditions in the country have really

meant that

victims have been impeded in being able to access the services they need, such as

rehabilitation,

psychological support

and economic inclusion

and

jobs and work placement or other financial support.

And those last

points, particularly psychological support and economic inclusion,

are

areas where

victims have seen the least progress

much less than in a

sense of rehabilitation.

on the whole.

So I'll leave it there and hand it over. Thank you very much for your time.

Thank you very much, Lauren. Um, and to almost all the speakers, uh, for

the insightful presentation

and contribution to the subject. At

this moment, I'll open the floor, um, four questions around the room

and also online.

Um, so

yes, please.

Hi. Thank you for taking my question. Uh, Nina Larson with a FP.

Um, I want I had a couple of questions.

Um, first on the issue of the number of casualties in Ukraine.

Uh, last year, compared to the year before, I understand that maybe all the

casualties haven't been, um,

haven't been recorded, but would that not also have been the case in 2022?

Uh, because there does seem to be a very large, uh, difference.

So if you could explain that a little bit better,

I think there's an echo. Your your mic is on. Thanks.

Um, And then, uh,

I was wondering if you've had any other countries

besides Lithuania who have signalled that they might be

considering withdrawing from the convention.

If if and sort of how you link this Lithuania's decision

to Ukraine. I mean, is it are they considering that these weapons have been

useful in their fight against Russia?

I'm just wondering if you could sort of explain that a little bit more

and, um,

also what way?

The use in Ukraine is impacting the stability of the convention itself. Thank you.

Thank you very much.

Laura, You wanna take the first question?

Yes, please. Um, thanks a lot. It's a really good question.

Um, certainly,

there are there. There's there's a grey area, an element of uncertainty

when it comes to casualty counting in conflict in general.

And the situation last year in Ukraine and last year really

saw a peak in recorded casualties during an annual period.

It was the most casualties recorded in a year.

Um, since the convention on class nations

entered into force, and that was because of Ukraine.

But there were some factors which may have made that information

more available, and that included some horrendous

attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure,

where there were multiple casualties. So that was picked up

by media.

And then there's another factor,

which is that there may also be significantly more military casualties

in 2023 than were recorded. It's possible. Um,

so there were numerous claims in Russian affiliated media

or by Russian ministries of cluster munition attacks on,

Ukrainian military forces. We note this in the report.

Um, they were always rounded estimates,

and they were all unverified.

But counting those together, that would be close to 900 casualties.

So it's certainly a matter of waiting until

information is verifiable.

one could hope that

changing

situation somehow led to significantly less,

um, civilian casualties.

Ah, but that's not clear, I think at this point.

Sorry.

Thanks very much, Nina, for your other questions,

including the one about any other countries signalling that they

intend to withdraw from the convention on Cluster Munitions.

We have not heard that yet.

Perhaps this week we'll hear more at the conventions meeting.

But it's fair to say that the countries

that border Russia are very nervous right now.

there are five kind of core humanitarian disarmament conventions.

Biological weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention,

the Cluster Munition Convention, the

Meba Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons That makes up the set of humanitarian disarmament instruments,

and Lithuania is the first to withdraw from any of them.

So Lithuania's withdrawal has a broader impact than

just on the convention on class munitions.

There are now concerns about containing what it has done

and trying to ensure that it doesn't spread any further.

As I mentioned, you know,

we believe the convention on Cluster Munitions is in strong standing,

with none of the state's parties engaging in any of the prohibited activities.

The problems lie outside.

The problems lie in countries such as Russia,

which has supported Syria's use of cluster munitions over

the past decade and which has used cluster munitions repeatedly

in Ukraine. Other problems lie in

United States, which, you know.

President Biden took the decision last July to transfer thousands of unreliable,

obsolete cluster munitions on to Ukraine

for use in the war there.

And that was a really devastating move for the United States,

but also for the convention because the United States hasn't

produced cluster munitions since 2007 hasn't used them since 2003,

and yet it has

vast stockpiles, which it is drawing on.

So I guess the lesson from all of this is that if you have the stocks and you're at war,

there's a high likelihood that they will be used.

And this is why we've placed such an emphasis over the last 15 years

on ensuring that countries who join the

convention destroy their stockpile class di munitions.

And that's where we're glad to have seen such progress.

But of course the problems remain outside

and we need to tackle and confront them.

Uh, especially this week.

So we'll be looking for strong, uh,

outcome documents at the Convention on Class Dimunition meeting this week,

which Mexico is presiding over

and looking for strong commitments from countries going forward,

uh, to support the convention on class Dimunition. Thanks.

Thank you very much. Yes, please.

Thank you for this report and thank you to be here.

My question is just only about the UN because we are now in the UN.

Your organisation is not

part of the UN family, but still you are working with them.

I just wanted to know what is concretely your relationship with the UN agencies.

If you are working with them to prepare this kind of report or not.

And

in general, what is your relation with the U?

Uh,

the class dimunition coalition has a long

history of co-operation with United Nations agencies,

the UN agencies that work to clear landmines and class dimunition such as En Masse

and U. NDP, who played a pivotal role in the development of the convention.

And

UNIR has supported the launches of the class dimunition monitor for years.

So this is a good example of the

partnership between civil society and the United Nations.

The same partnership exists with the International Committee of the Red

Cross and with the country who are part of the convention

transfer.

The,

uh the,

uh

the, uh the

American

responsibility.

No.

As I understand it.

The question is about what is Germany's responsibilities as a state party.

Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions,

at least 34 countries have who are part of the Convention on Class Di Munitions

have declared that the transit and foreign

stockpiling of class di munitions are explicitly prohibited

by the convention through the prohibition on

assistance we used to regard Germany as

as being in that camp.

But we pulled them off the list this year after the evidence came forward,

that US class dimunition is based on a located stored at a base.

A US base in Germany have been pulled off

that base transferred through German territory onto Poland,

which is not a member and into Ukraine.

Um, it raises all sorts of concerns for the convention on class dimunition,

you know,

in the very first place.

Germany should have told the United States to

get rid of the class dimunition straight away

when the convention was open for signature in 2008.

That's what Norway and the United Kingdom did,

and the United States removed stockpiles from their respective territories.

The Wikileaks cables,

the State Department cables that were leaked by Wikileaks more than a decade ago,

they showed that the United States stockpiles cluster munitions

at its base is in other countries as well,

and they may still perhaps be there on the bases in Italy and Spain

and Netherlands

and other countries as well.

We'd urge those states parties to tell the

United States to remove those close dimunition now.

So this goes back to the United States

and its inability to sign the convention, let alone acknowledge that the

convention on class dimunition exists.

Uh,

we look to state parties to take a strong stance

on this because it's it's inconsistent with their their commitment,

uh,

to to the absolute prohibitions to be allowing a state par a

non state party such as the US to to do this.

Thanks.

Thank you very much,

Mary. Yes, please.

And then, um

I think this question

up

now

the

No.

Yes. So was it

related to the new

conflict in Gaza?

So we have. What we have is the evidence of of the legacy contamination in Lebanon.

But we do not have evidence of new

contamination due to the new conflict.

If this was the question,

so

the

line

up

Yes, I have another part. The situation today in Lebanon, we know.

In 2006, Israel launched

many bombs in south of Lebanon

today. What is the situation?

Thank you.

And if you have some information about Gaza,

Israel uses this kind of bomb in Gaza.

Yeah. So to the situation in Lebanon,

we have the detailed data in terms of contamination in our country profile.

So there is remaining contamination left.

And as I briefly mentioned,

Lebanon currently struggles accessing the remaining contamination.

And they also keep finding new

contamination contamination They didn't know before,

So they are still conducting a survey as well.

But we are confident that this contamination is going to be cleared.

Let's say in the near future Lebanon struggles as well with having

the financial means to clear the rest based on their economic crisis.

But they are exploring

new possibilities for

new funding

or

the thinking about the crowd funding.

So

I would say the situation is moving in the right direction.

in terms of the conflict in Gaza,

we do not have any evidence of any contamination on use.

But, Marie, you're probably going to say something about that Yeah,

yeah, thanks very much.

I just want to confirm that we've not seen any evidence

of cluster munitions being used in Gaza or in south Lebanon.

The last

Israel's last use of cluster munitions was in south Lebanon in 2006,

and its last production

of cluster munitions was around about 2018 when the last cluster

munition producer in Israel shut down that line of of business.

It's also important to note that cluster munitions we've not seen any

evidence of new cluster dimunition use in Sudan in that current conflict.

Uh,

so this is why we we highlight those three countries in the

report as being the ones where cluster munitions are being used today,

which is in Myanmar, Syria and Ukraine.

Thanks.

Thank you very much, Mary. Yes, please.

Thank you very much

for

the news. Japan.

Um I just have a question regarding the projection.

Um, how a RE you justifying and verifying every year

that, uh, So, um, sorry. North Korea is producing,

uh, cluster munitions.

Thank you.

So we list countries as producing class di munitions until they tell us otherwise.

And until they commit

not to produce in future and So there is

evidence that North and South Korea have produced Glass di

munitions and they'll remain on that list until they

tell us otherwise and commit not to do so.

Or better yet until they accede to the convention on Cluster Munitions.

And, uh, you know, we we write to governments,

use Official Information Act requests and and some researchers attended the Euros

arms exhibition in Paris this year in June,

where they saw companies from India and South

Korea promoting Class di munitions for sale there,

which is actually illegal in France under their national

implementing legislation for the Convention on Class dimunition.

So after the organisers were alerted,

I understand that those those those class

di munitions were pulled from the promotional part

of it.

So we have two problems here.

We've got vast numbers of stocks of cluster munitions held by countries who

have not joined the convention,

and there's also new production in certain countries.

But most importantly,

a big number of countries that are refusing to join the convention

and that are leaving the door open to keep producing in future.

Any more questions from the room?

How long?

OK,

Are there any questions online, please?

Yes. La

Roo, Swiss News Agency. Uh, thank you for taking my questions.

Um, as the coalition tried to engage with the Lithuanian authorities.

And, uh,

do you have any indication that they might

reverse their decision in the next six months

and then, uh, clarification? Because in the news release, it was mentioned 28

countries and territories contaminated or suspected to be contaminated.

And I think, uh, when you raised that, uh, at the beginning of the press conference,

Miss Atkins, you mentioned 27.

So just to clarify that thank you.

This

I'll take the question on. Have we tried to engage Lithuania?

My organisation, Human Rights Watch, was in Vilnius exactly a year ago,

talking to the Lithuanian government about this rumour that we'd heard

from a posting on Facebook by the defence Minister that Lithuania

was going to look to leave the convention on Class Di munitions,

and and and we and other members of the class diminish coalition

alerted governments who are part of the treaty.

The Red Cross, the United Nations and over the last year,

engaged in a lot of behind the scenes diplomacy to

try and encourage Lithuania not to go down this dangerous path

once the instrument or once the proposal to

withdraw from the convention was introduced in Parliament.

That put it out in the public spotlight. And that was the moment at which

people started to read about this move

in the media.

To be honest, it all depends,

or much much depends on the coming week and on not so much what

we say as civil society but what the treaty states parties say to Lithuania.

And we know that Mexico,

its presidents and other members of the Convention on class munitions have been

doing their utmost to try and convince Lithuania not to leave the convent.

It's it's

It's baffling because Lithuania never had Class di munitions.

It never acquired them, never stockpiled them, never used them

and all of a sudden it see a need to have Class di munitions as a as a deterrent,

as it says

it will find issues with procuring class di munitions. We are sure,

and so we plan to continue to keep up that dialogue.

I see the Lithuanian ambassador this Wednesday.

It's important that we keep talking to Lithuania

and it's really important that we have the conventions six

months waiting period before the withdrawal goes into effect.

This convention was designed to be of use not just in times of peace,

but in times of armed conflict when times get tough.

And this is why it's dismaying to see Lithuania take this move.

Yes, and the second answer is a short one. It is 28 states in other areas.

If I said 27 I apologise. That was wrong. 28 states.

Are there any more questions?

I think that, uh, perhaps, uh, brings us to

the end of, um, this afternoon's presentation.

whilst it appears that there is a marked, uh, improvement,

Uh,

in

the fight against cluster ammunitions, there appears to assist

a lot of challenges that perhaps,

uh, we need to resolve going into the future.

civilians still suffer, uh, from the use of cluster ammunitions,

as the presentations have shown,

and Children

account for

nearly half of cluster ammunition remnants.

And so it tells us that there are still some major challenges for us to

to deal with,

uh, on behalf of the United Nations in Institute for Disarmament Research

and, um,

on C MC.

Um I want to thank

the presenters, uh, for

the insightful presentation

and valuable contribution to the subject.

And I will encourage,

uh, the media and our participant in the room to widely circulate the report.

Uh, and make sure that it gets to,

uh, almost everybody.

Thank you very much for your valuable contribution speakers and, uh,

have a good afternoon.

Thank you.