UNCTAD Press conference 22 October 2024
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Press Conferences | UNCTAD

UNCTAD Press conference 22 October 2024

REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2024 – LAUNCH IN GENEVA 

UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) launched today the Review of Maritime Transport 2024: Navigating maritime chokepoints, which addresses critical vulnerabilities in global maritime routes, including the Suez and Panama canals. 

DESCRIPTION 

STORY: UNCTAD / Review of Maritime Transport 

TRT: 02:55 

SOURCE: UNCTAD 

RESTRICTIONS: NONE 

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH / NATS 

WEBSITE: https://unctad.org/rmt2024 

DATELINE: 22 OCTOBER 2024, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND 

SHOTLIST 

1. Wide shot, speakers at the podium of the press conference; speaker on screens, photographer taking pictures 

2. SOUNDBITE (English) Shamika Sirimanne, UN Trade and Development, Director of Technology and Logistics: « We project maritime trade to grow at an average annual rate of 2.4% in the medium term. This is between 2025 and 2029, and containerized trade to increase by 2.7% in the medium term. Now, we believe that this growth to be supported by technological advancements, the transition to cleaner energy and renewed interest in investing in maritime and trade infrastructure. »  

3. Medium shot, speakers on the podium; speaker on the screens; Photographer taking pictures. 

4. SOUNDBITE (English) Shamika Sirimanne, UN Trade and Development, Director of Technology and Logistics: « The downside risks loom high for this medium-term projection. The geopolitical upheavals, unrelenting conflicts and wars never, never bode well for international trade. Rising protectionism and the resultant trade restrictions are on the rise. » 

5. Medium shot, journalists in the press room; speaker on screen 

6. SOUNDBITE (English) Shamika Sirimanne, UN Trade and Development, Director of Technology and Logistics: « And many low-income countries are faced with rising debt burdens, elevated borrowing cost and and they are unable to face further external shocks. You see, when the future is uncertain or the future is very uncertain as consumers us, what we do first is to tighten belts and we don't spend and invest, just go into the wait and see mode. » 

7. Med shot, journalists in the press room 

8. SOUNDBITE (English) Shamika Sirimanne, UN Trade and Development, Director of Technology and Logistics: « maritime choke points in several places have been acting up. The result is significant pressure on global logistics and strained supply chains. » 

9. Wide shot, speakers at the podium of the press conference; speaker on screens, photographer taking pictures 

10. SOUNDBITE (English) Shamika Sirimanne, UN Trade and Development, Director of Technology and Logistics: « By mid 2024, container freight rates more than doubled compared to the end 2023. And also red sea disruption has had significant impact on container rates. While rates have gone down in recent months. They are far above the rates observed prior to the Covid 19 pandemic, and this is a very big concern. And most importantly, high and volatile freight rates and the uncertainty they bring to the cost of doing business on a significant deterrent for international trade. » 

11. Medium shot, speaker on the screens; journalist in the room; Photographer taking pictures. 

12. SOUNDBITE (English) Shamika Sirimanne, UN Trade and Development, Director of Technology and Logistics: « Who bears the cost? So, when maritime chokepoints act up, small island developing states and least developed countries are hit the hardest in terms of rising price levels of food and other essential goods. »  

13. Medium shot, speaker on the screens; Photographer taking pictures. 

14. Medium shot, journalist in the room. 

15. Photographer taking pictures in the room. 

STORYLINE 

Global maritime trade grew by 2.4% in 2023, recovering from a 2022 contraction, but the recovery remains fragile. 

Key chokepoints like the Suez and Panama Canals are increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical tensions, conflicts and climate change. 

These disruptions are extending shipping routes, straining supply chains and raising costs, with profound impacts on food security, energy supplies and the global economy, as over 80% of world trade volume is carried by sea. 

Vulnerable economies, especially small island developing States and least developed countries, are hit hardest by rising shipping costs from rerouted vessels. 

The Review of Maritime Transport 2024 highlights these challenges, calling for urgent action to strengthen industry resilience, accelerate decarbonization and support vulnerable economies. 

It underscores the need for new infrastructure that is sustainable and resilient, a faster transition to low-carbon shipping and a crackdown on fraudulent ship registrations to safeguard global trade.  

Production date: 22 October 2024 

Creator: UNCTAD 

Subject topical: ECONOMICS 

Corporate name: UN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT – UNCTAD 

 

Teleprompter
Good afternoon everyone and thank you for for joining us today for the launch of the review of Maritime Transport 2024 by UN Trade and Development.
As you know, this report is a key reference for anyone concerned with global trade and its future in the face, especially of current disruptions which UNKTEL has been covering over the past period, especially the importance of maritime transport in sustaining global trade, particularly for developing countries according to Umtad's mandate.
With us today, we have Miss Shamika Celimani, she's Director of Umtad's Division on Technology and Logistics.
And we have also a colleague, John Hoffman who was lead on the maritime transport.
He has been, he's been doing for, for many, many years now.
Navigating Maritime Choke Points is this year's title, touching on key issues that matter to all of us, trade, development and resilience in the face of new challenges.
Missy Imani will take us through these findings, highlighting the importance of maritime trade as a lifeline for economies, especially in vulnerable regions.
Afterwards, we will open the floor for questions from both the room and for those connected online to either the director or, of course, to our colleague John Hoffman.
Thank you very much, the Director.
The floor is yours.
Thank you so much, Marcelo, and good day to all of you who are here.
Good afternoon and joining from elsewhere.
A good day to all of you.
[Other language spoken]
1st is the macroeconomic outlook on maritime trade.
We expect a modest 2% growth for 2024, driven by demand for bulk commodities like iron ore, coal and grain, and also as a result of container trade picking up from basically an abysmal growth of .3% in 2023 to a robust growth of 3.5 in 2024.
Now, this projection for 2024 is very much in line with the trends in the world economy.
Stable, slow and resilient global growth predicted at around 3.23 point 4% for this year and some easing of inflationary pressures in major economies.
Now, going forward, we project maritime trade to grow at an average annual rate of 2.4% in the medium term.
This is between 2025 and 2029 and containerised trade to increase by 2.7% in the medium term.
Now we believe that this growth to be supported by technological advancements, the transition to cleaner energy and renewed interest in investing in maritime and trade infrastructure.
I'm talking about there's a lot of interesting smart and green ports and improving hinterland connectivity and digitalization of processes, trade and transport processes.
And here is the bad news.
The downside risk loom **** for this medium term projection.
You see, the geopolitical upheavals, unrelenting conflicts and wars never, never bode well for international trade.
Rising protectionism and the resultant trade restrictions are on the rise.
Elections are taking place or have just taken place in some of the major economies around the world.
So we have to watch out for the policy directions of incoming administrations.
And many low income countries are faced with rising debt burdens, elevated borrowing cost and in and they are unable to face further external shocks.
You see when the future is uncertain or the future is very uncertain as consumers us what we do first is the tighten bells and we don't spend and investors go into the wait and see mode and as a result economy suffer an international trade with it.
So that's so in essence the the downside risk for the medium term projections are very ****.
Now my second point and also the theme of the report about the maritime choke points.
These maritime choke points in several places have been acting up.
The result is significant pressure on global logistics and strained supply chains.
The question is, is this the new normal?
And if it's the new normal, what do we do?
[Other language spoken]
I think many of you know maritime choke points are critical points along transport routes with limited alternative routes.
Take the Suez Canal for example.
About 10% of world maritime trade by volume and 22% of containerised trade cross the Suez Canal annually.
Now the traffic through the Panama and Suez Canals dropped by over 50% by mid 2024 compared to their peaks in late 2023.
Like the, I'm sorry, the mid 2023 they had peaks and compared to that mid 2020 450% drop.
Climate induced low water levels in the Panama Canal on the one hand and the outbreak of conflict in the Red Sea region and affecting the Suez Canal, for example, I think we have said in our report, cargo rerouting around Africa surged massively with ship capacity arrivals increasing by almost 90%.
Now the result, the result of all these chalk points acting up is longer routes, port congestion, higher fuel consumption, higher wages of crew, higher freight rates and rising insurance premiums and the list goes on South.
Let me focus on couple of those things.
Maritime trade in tonne miles is on the rise.
I think we have charts in our reports, look at the page two of the overview, we have a figure showing that the this tonne, tonne miles trade is up.
But by mid 2024 rerouting vessels had increased container ship demand by 12%.
This is mostly due to the Red Sea situation and but by mid 2024 container freight rates more than doubled compared to the end 2023.
And also, Red Sea disruption has had significant impact on container rates.
While rates have gone down in recent months, they are far above the rates observed prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.
And this is a very big concern.
And most importantly, **** and volatile freight rates and the uncertainty they bring to the cost of doing business are a significant deterrent for international trade.
And the small traders and developing countries are the most affected.
So anything to do with **** and volatile anything is not good.
And then on congestion, the port hubs like Singapore, the major Mediterranean ports, the those in Africa were under pressure and also because of the demand for transception transshipment and on emissions, they went up.
We have an example in the press release saying that when diverting around Africa instead of using the Suez Canal, a typical big container ship on the Far East Europe trade route adds 400 thousand U.S.
[Other language spoken]
So that's the situation.
Now the Third Point, who bears the cost?
So when maritime choke points act up, small island developing States and least developed countries are hit the hardest in terms of rising price levels of food and other essential goods, and we have done calculations to show how hard they have been hit.
Now the small island developing states also rely heavily on shipping for essential imports, but their maritime connectivity has declined by 9% on average over the past decade, making their isolation more pronounced.
And this is a concern.
[Other language spoken]
In our report we put an enormous amount of emphasis to say building resilient to a wide-ranging disruptions is urgently needed because we are in a disruption.
Disruption is the new normal.
We have provided specific set of recommendations.
Let me give you few of them.
We say strengthen international cooperation and enhance monitoring systems to stabilise trade routes, provide early warning and enable rapid efficient rerouting of vessels.
Diversify shipping routes and support regional trade initiatives to reduce dependency on long distance routes and boost intra regional trade flows.
That's more resilient.
Invest urgently in resilient infrastructure at key choke points to minimise the impact of climate risks and conflicts.
Address the emerging new issues in the maritime landscape, for example, legal implications, as companies must now factor climate risks into shipping contracts to minimise losses and legal disputes and to keep trade flowing and insurance affordable.
And in fact, we have a whole chapter dedicated to on this topic of legal implications.
So finally, the disruptions at the Suez and Panama Canals highlight the fragility of global supply chains in the face of mounting climate and geopolitical risks.
With global trade accounting for over 80% of seaborne transportation, ensuring the resilience of maritime infrastructure and accelerating the transition to low carbon shipping are critical for maintaining the stability of global training.
So thank you so much over to you.
Thank you for this overview.
Again, the key assessments, the insights and a bit of looking ahead in the context of vulnerability, uncertainty and who pays, who pays the price.
I think I have here from the floor here at the Palais, there's no questions.
So we go directly over to online.
I see here one hand raised to start with Paula Dupras Dobiard, please.
[Other language spoken]
Yes, good afternoon.
Thank you very much for that presentation.
I'm sorry if I missed the first couple of minutes of the presentation, but I have two questions.
First of all, with the the issue of climate change and I'm thinking about the impact on that it's had on the Panama Canal.
I'm wondering if we can imagine in the future near or further potentially a closure of that that route.
And then secondly, I wanted to know, understand from your perspective how you see the efforts by the sector, freight and shipping sector on transitioning away from the most polluting fuels that had been used in the past, how that's proceeding, if they're on schedule and so forth?
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
One climate impact example, Panama Canal that we witness also with the with the Secretary General and with our colleague Jan Hoffman here early in the in the year and then low carbon maritime transport.
[Other language spoken]
I think that the, the question you raised about the climate change is, is very, very pertinent.
You see what we have not seen what, what we saw at the Panama Canal, You know, it's the, the impact came so fast and so hard.
And I don't think it was ever anticipated, you know, such a drought would come, the water would levels would fall that far.
And then, you know, this would affect the the global shipping.
But I think this is the new normal.
I think we need, we will have to, we will have to anticipate lot more climate change, induce supply chain difficulties as we go forward, especially, you know, when these things happen at in choke points, then you basically, you know, everything come to an standstill.
I think I, I will also get Yan because Yan has been talking about the shipping sector and the decarbonisation and, and done a lot of work.
Let me give to Yan to address this issue.
But I want to say one thing.
I think it's, I mean, we all need to decarbonise every sector.
That's the future.
I mean, we are now talking about the climate change impact of all our lives.
So this is something we had to do, but it also has to be done with due consideration given to developing countries, especially to low income countries.
They need to be supported to to create new investments as we transition towards a low carbon shipping or low carbon world.
I think Yan you can, I think probably you would know more about the technicalities.
[Other language spoken]
Yeah, on the two question, also the one on the hypothetical question, what would happen if the Panama Canal were really 100% closed.
In fact, on the differences between the two canals, Zwiss and Panama, there's some really novel insightful research in our report.
Please look at figures five and seven from the overview.
It's really worth it.
But you'll see that how different canals have different impacts in different sectors.
In the Panama Canal, if, if it closes, you can still get containerised trade to the United States via the Pacific, then you use a land bridge from Los Angeles to New York or via Zoois if Zoois is open.
While for dry bulk there are very little alternatives.
So the dry bulk that goes through the Panama Canal has no alternatives.
And we have seen with the current restrictions.
So that's not hypothetical, it's hard data.
The business it was most affected by the Panama Canal crisis where the dry bike, the grains, coal and so on trades while the Zeus Canal had a huge impact especially on container freight rates.
[Other language spoken]
So that is on that first question hypothetically if it were to close down completely.
[Other language spoken]
So we have the review of my time transport with our analysis and with the kind help of Marcelo and and team and the we have a data story where we have updated just for you until yesterday, the very, very latest data where we can show that the Panama is Panama Canal is actually recovering.
It still faces challenges with the latest average like 30 transits per day, which is 30% below it's peak, but it is already 40% above the previous low point where the zoo is canal is still today 57% below it's peak and not above it's at it's low point.
So there you see these different trends.
On the second question of the the decarbonisation of the sector, yes, we have worked very intensively on this last year's river.
My Time Transport has a whole special chapter on it since we published last year's report.
Unfortunately we realise emissions are still going up.
Total emissions from shipping continue to increase, although they should be decreasing now.
[Other language spoken]
If you look at the numbers, emissions per tonne of cargo or per tonne mile, we do see improvements.
However, half of that improvement is just economies of scale.
It's because ships get bigger and would be a long story.
We are not fans of ever bigger ships.
They have other disadvantages on market concentration, on door to door costs, on infrastructure needs.
So your question was about are we on track or not?
I dare say the international organisation and it's members, they are on track with their objectives.
They have advanced a lot with the negotiations of how to get there.
They have not yet agreed, but we at Ankit have helped them to come to an agreement and with the research we have done, some of it is in the review.
It is quite clear to us that you need a combination of technical measures and economic measures.
Famico also refer to it the the economic measure being some price on carbon achieves 2 things.
First, it makes the alternative fuels competitive and secondly, it generates funding that can then be invested in the energy transition, especially in those that are most negatively affected, the small island developing states, least developed countries.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
I'm not sure if you have more questions on online.
I can't see any, any virtual hands raised and there's a question Francais, we have interpretation here.
If anybody online wishes to speak on Francais en Espanol, Deutsche Convertor unbeaten at Hoc, I think there is no further question.
So just to wrap it up, if I, if I may, dear colleagues who_the critical vulnerability of maritime choke points such as the Suez and the Panama canals will remind you of our figure.
These canals handle around 80% of the world's goods by volume.
Hence the importance, addressing the vulnerabilities in maritime choke points is not just about trade, it's about safeguarding global food security as well and energy supplies.
Urgent resilience building is needed across the globe, the global maritime transport system particularly, and this was addressed as climate change has increasingly disrupted key shipping routes.
And I take note that there are two more questions from online.
[Other language spoken]
So we have one.
I take them in the order as I see them.
There are three more.
As they come to, it's good.
First the floor to Matt Coin from Tradewinds.
[Other language spoken]
Hi, yeah, in the in the in the report it's mentioned sort of combating fraudulent ship registration.
We talked a little bit about sort of all the issues sort of facing maritime transportation and, and how you know, there's significant downside risks to the projections you've made.
I guess I was just wondering, you know, that that, that you're concerned about these fraudulent ship registrations sort of suggests that you're aware of that there's almost sort of becoming 2 tiers at least in, in oil tanker trades.
And could you speak at all maybe to the issues that A2 tier shipping market could create where there's like sort of a mainstream market and then the shadow fleet and all the issues that come with that and attempting to build resilience and combat climate change, green, you know, green shipping, all of that.
Yeah, thank you, Tradewinds.
Yeah, no, thanks for a good question.
Angktat collaborated again with the IMO and World Malta University and IMLI and Malta on a on a study on the fraudulent ship registration.
This to some extent it was not sure it was initiated because of of currency, but it's a long term story it is it's not something that has has just appeared.
We have always had situations where ships try to avoid regulations in general, not so much the the sanctions and then swap the flag.
And this has become actually more difficult over the last, yes, decades.
We do want to distinguish this from the what you mentioned, the recent dark fleet or shadow fleet, which is to some extent made easier by quickly switching the flag and possibly to a fraudulent.
Like you register a flag and you claim that I'm flying this flag, but actually you never really registered there.
So to make the fraudulent registration more difficult, the IMO is working on an update of existing regulations and trying to enforce them more.
Yeah, forcefully.
And there, as I said, we have collaborated with them with a study, also with some statistics and some legal assessment.
The dark fleet and shadow fleet, it's also about switching off your satellite system.
It's really to be totally under the radar and with or without fraudulent registration.
So it's a bit to clarify.
These are two separate things, but they're both quite important and you have a quite detailed, good assessment, legal assessment of these, especially for the fraudulent trip registration issue in Chapter 5.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
We have another question online, two more for the time being, Nuran Aircool from the agency Anadolu, please.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
Thank you for the opportunity to ask.
I would like to ask with regards to to who pays the price part, do you have any observation on how the increasing freight rates and the costs have reflected on the consumers in terms of goods price?
And a second question on the rerouting to the Cape of Good Hope, do you see that the rerouting could be kind of permanent given the continuing situation in the region?
[Other language spoken]
Let me start talking a bit about The Who pays the for the rising freight rates.
We've done a quite an extensive simulation analysis to just to ask this question and we find it's disproportionately is falling on small island developing States and on least developed countries.
We find that they are hit hard by, you know, the moment the freight rates go up because they are depending on enormous amount of imports for their essential food and for energy and other essential goods.
And moments the freight rate goes up, it then translates into increased consumer prices and which then leads to inflationary pressures.
And, and, and, and the biggest impacts are on these two groups.
And in fact, we even had done calculations of to say how much the food prices would increase and how much the general inflation would rise.
And so that's one thing.
And, and the second thing is that, you know, are we going to see the Cape of Good Hope as the rerouting point forever?
I think when when it started, there were lot of issues of congestion and then the ports unable to manage these flows of capacity coming their way.
[Other language spoken]
See now, you know, there's a little less pressure, there's a little, you know, learn learning by doing.
But you know, going through the entire going through Cape of Good Hope also means long distances.
It also means, you know, higher freight rates, it means **** insurance.
It means all sorts of **** cost, you know, added to the wages.
So again, the the longer the routes, the higher the prices and the burden will back be again on consumers and and especially the consumers on small island developing countries and least developed countries who are depending on the ships to bring them food and essential medicine and essential goods to their shores.
So this is a very big concern, I think.
[Other language spoken]
You want to add some?
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
No, a very good question.
Who pays the price when we did our assessment on the long term impact if we decarbonize shipping and that leads to higher freight rates in the long term by 2040, by 2050, the normal standard assumption modelling is and we pay the consumer pays in the end.
In competitive markets at some point in time it is passed on to the final client.
So the consumer pays.
However, we have to distinguish between who pays and who is impacted.
Example, price of shipping bananas from Ecuador to Germany goes up, price for banana goes up.
My mother in Hamburg pays more for her bananas.
So the consumer pays, who will be impacted?
The producer of bananas in Ecuador will still be impacted because in the end, my mother will buy a bit fewer bananas from Ecuador and a little more apples from nearby or bananas from Las Palmas.
So I just want to clarify this.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
Who is the one impact, who is suffering even though the consumer pays in the end in the long term And we do believe overall most shipping markets are competitive, but still also exporters for example from South America are impacted.
In terms of the specific numbers, as Shamika rightly pointed out, the we had done these assessments of how this impacts prices.
And thank you also for this question.
Already 2 1/2 years ago, three years ago, actually, it started when, when Paul Kochman was still saying do not worry about inflation during COVID.
We already did a simulation at that time and said, well, if container freight rates go up by so and so much, we expect that global consumer prices will go up by 1.5 percentage points due to the higher freight rates during COVID.
Six months later, now 2 1/2 years ago, like 6 months after we did that, the Internet Monetary Fund calculated, oh, we have inflation and they confirmed that 1.5 percentage point of that inflation at that time was due to higher prices.
So with this experience, we are confident that our method is good because it was verified this river.
Madam Transport, you will see that the more recent surge in freight rate not quite as bad as during COVID, but also ****.
So you will see in in Chapter 3, I believe it is.
So if the current crisis on the choke points continues and the freight rates continue to remain ****, the consumer prices could rise by 0.6% by 2025 or by end of 25.
I believe so.
There's always a time lag and the increase of prices for six small Indian states is 50% bigger 0.9%.
So I hope that answers your questions.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
Yeah, I forgot the secondary.
I had to turn around my page.
There was a question of the ships going around South Africa and also Shamika alluded to this initially the the African ports were not ready for the search, especially the huge container flips.
They don't have cargo for, for Abidjan or for Durban or for Mombasa.
But they may need to stop for repairs, for bunkering.
And it just caused additional congestion and, and we were asked, should African ports now invest in, in new capacities in better hinterland to benefit from the addition of ships.
And it's really a very, very tricky question.
If we knew the answer to your very good question, how long this will last, then we would say, yes, invest, it's an opportunity.
But if you now invest and, and we hope not too many months, ships will again take the more efficient route, less costly, less CO2 emissions, faster then this investment would have done, been done in vain.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
As you know and economics is at least you know, 2 perspectives to one single reality, if not many more.
And we have two more questions online here posted by the chat, first from Justine Fontaine from Radio France International.
I'm going to read it out to you.
Colleagues, Can you elaborate on what are the concrete consequences for African countries of geopolitical issues in the Red Sea?
[Other language spoken]
Also, what perspectives do you see for 2024 regarding African countries again?
So it's Africa with two focus with two with two different perspectives, one concrete consequences for African countries of the geopolitical issues in and around the Red Sea and of course, the perspectives for 2024 and I guess also for the immediate future in the new year.
[Other language spoken]
Let me start saying something and then I think we have a whole piece that we developed for the continent and that, yeah, you can drag that one, bring that one.
Let me say the consequences for African countries, you know, a lot of African countries are small open economies.
They're not massive economies.
There's only 10% of their GDP's in export and import trade.
No, they are small open economies, meaning there's, they depend largely on international trade for their growth, for the competition and also for their well-being, meaning imports coming their way, the food, the medicine and so forth.
So any kind of geopolitical situation that creates difficulties for supply chains, these countries get affected.
And it is, it's very simple and they are at the brunt of any geopolitical, geopolitical upheavals that upend the International Maritime trade, the supply chain situation, logistics situation.
They affect African countries because they are small open economies, most of them.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
Yeah, very, very true.
We two additional thoughts on this impact especially in Africa.
We did calculate what share of countries trade normally goes through zoo as you have this in Figure 1.7.
So if I go by order of of share, the biggest share, almost 34% of trade by volume of Sudan would normally go through the Wiz.
That's our estimate, followed by Yemen, followed by Djibouti, followed by Saudi Arabia, followed by Sifel.
So those are the top five countries whose trade just quantitatively is most negatively affected by the limitations of going through the Wiz.
Second to to complement when you say Africa, we often may think just sub-Saharan Africa.
Of course Egypt itself and also other northern African countries, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean are very negatively affected.
[Other language spoken]
The Egypt first loses the income from it's canal.
Secondly, it loses the business of its transshipment port and, and the hot ports and the the services.
And thirdly, Egypt and other Eastern Mediterranean countries, they're all of a sudden no longer at the centre of routes that connect and may have a hot port and transshipment in Imperios, in in Malta, in Jordaodo or in in Egypt, but all of a sudden at the end of a culdesac.
How do you say this in English dead end?
So the ships have to go the long way and then they may trend ship in Morocco.
So Tanja made benefits from the city and that's a different amount, Valencia, Barcelona.
So there is some additional positive impact.
And the third impact Famika already alluded to, if you have a global increase in freight costs, those countries that are more open depend more on shipping, be they in Africa or be they in the Pacific, are the ones more negatively affected.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
We have one more question, also via chat from Inyaki Carrera from the Spanish digital newspaper El Mercantil.
It's in relation to food security specifically, which we addressed before and I really doubt in relation to food security.
Ukraine has just asked the IMO of the International Maritime Organisation for help in curbing Russian attacks on grain carrying merchant ships in the Black Sea.
It is a fact that Russia has intensified its offensive against the port of Odessa and commercial vessels in the area.
What solutions?
And here comes the question.
Against that backdrop backdrop, the journalist asks, what solution does Ungtad propose to put an end to these attacks and to the food war waged by Russia to dominate African and less developed countries?
Now, before passing the floor to our director, just let me remind everybody that Ungtad's role is technical.
The organisation does not have a direct mandate, of course, to address military conflicts or even maritime security.
[Other language spoken]
Of course, we must focus on our expertise, which is in and around trade and development.
[Other language spoken]
Thank you very much.
I think I want to bring you back to what I said about the downside risk when we talk about the 2025 and beyond.
And I said the downside risks loom and very **** and want to emphasise geopolitical upheavals, unrelenting conflicts and wars never bode well for international trade and maritime trade.
So it's the peace equal more trade.
So that's what we would like to see.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
No, as Marcelo rightly pointed out, there are some aspects that are really more the mandate of the IMO.
But I think we can proudly say that Ankita participated in the Global Crisis Group, Our Secretary General was I believe instrumental in certain solutions the the Black Sea, the grain initiative.
So that requires collaboration between countries between Ukraine, Russian Federation, Turkey and and the United Nations.
So there's really not that we can add here, but based on our assessment analysis, let me share with you assessment we did already earlier when the war started and now you could say answering your question when the war restarts or we have again this situation, two things happen.
First, there is less food available, so demand supply of food, food prices go up.
Second thing is those especially countries like Egypt, but also Ghana, Sichel, Djibouti, all of a sudden have to purchase their grain from further away and that has a again a double impact.
First you have to pay for more days of shipping.
You have to charter ships for more days, which is more money.
You have to pay more days of shipping.
And secondly, just as in food, you have demand, supply and prices go up and down in shipping.
Also the cost per day of chartering a ship goes up and down with demand and supply.
So when we did the previous assessment, we found that half of the increase in the food price after the Warner Crane started, half was due to transport.
And of that half, again half, meaning like about 25% was due to the additional days of shipping and the other 25% due to higher costs per day of shipping.
I hope that's not too complicated and technical, but it is an attempt to answer your question.
[Other language spoken]
Thank you very much, Jan.
Thank you very much, Director Simone.
Thank everybody for attending, for the the questions.
The report is up there.
You have it in your inboxes.
We have the general overview, We have a general press release.
We have spin offs, 4 regions.
Africa was addressed also Asia and Pacific, also Latin America.
And of course we remain available for any, any follow up.
Thank you very much.