Good afternoon everybody and thank you for joining us here at the Pallet Nation and and online for this press conference with the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial summary and or arbitrary executions on just Calamar.
Miss Calamar presented her report to the Human Rights Council this morning and the interactive discussion on that report concluded we had about 30 states roughly who spoke, a handful of NGOs as well.
You have copies of that statement.
So I will turn over immediately Miss Calamar for her remarks and to you for your questions.
Many thanks for giving me this opportunity to share with you some of the main aspect of my thematic report on the use of drones for the purpose of targeted killings.
As more armies, government and non state actors acquire armed drones and use them for targeted killing, there is a clear danger that war will come to be seen as normal rather than the opposite of peace.
In fact, war is at risk of being normalised as a legitimate and necessary companion to peace and not it's opposite, and we must do all that we can to resist this deadly creep.
Urgent measures must be taken by Parliament and UN bodies to prevent further and deadly deterioration both in the protection of human rights and in global peace and security.
At least 102 countries have active stocks of military drones.
35 of them possess the most deadliest of all drones.
20 armed non state actors also have access to to armed drones.
Drones are becoming stealthier, speedier, smaller, more lethal and can be operated by teams located thousands of kilometres away.
And in my opinion and the opinion of all the experts I have consulted over the last six months, this is bringing the world to a critical point in regulating the use of armed drones and the use of force through armed drones.
Their proliferation and the expanding technological powers are essentially unregulated, and they have come to symbolise an increasing disregard by States and armed groups of fundamental humanitarian and human rights principles.
Too many politicians admire the perceived efficiency, effectiveness, adaptability, acceptability and deniability of drones.
There is no political cost associated with drones, unlike the deployment of armed troops.
There is no cost to the lives of our quotation mark soldiers attached to the deployment of armed drones.
We are also falling prey to the dangerous myth of the surgical strike where supposedly only the intended target is killed.
This is far from being the case, and technology obscures the true number of casualties and death are rarely properly investigated and even more rarely reported on in a transparent fashion.
In theory, international human rights law places stringent conditions on the use of lethal force.
However, to justify targeted killings by armed drones, states I've engaged in what I have referred to as legal distortion, legal contortion or legal gymnastics.
They have reinterpreted the principle of self defence to permit, for instance, so-called pre emptive strikes, including on the territory of non belligerent states which were not engaged in any kind of conflict but supposedly were unable or unwelling to deal with a perceived ******.
The other distortion is linked to international humanitarian law and has been characterised by the notion of a global globalised international or non international armed conflict and the outcome is that low intensity or supposedly low intensity conflict are drawn out beyond any geographical or temporal boundaries and drones have been at the heart of of those development because of the distance that the drones allow between the parties that strike and the target.
Until January of this year drones had been used for the purpose of targeting a representative of armed groups that had been deemed a ****** by a number of governments, particularly under the concept of terrorism.
On January 3rd, 2020, the world moved into a very different space.
On that day, the United States used unarmed drones to target and **** Iran's top general, Qassem Soleimani, as well as a number of his companions, including largely Iraqi representative.
That is a significant and troubling new development.
It is the first known incident in which a state invokes self defence as justification for an attack against a government official outside a declared armed conflict.
The international community must now confront the real prospect that states could opt, on the basis of that precedent, to strategically eliminate ****-ranking military or non military officials outside the context of a known war and to justify that killing on the ground of self defence.
Understood in this very elastic fashion which I have just presented.
As a result of the development, both legal, technological and practically on the ground, I think we are facing a tipping point in this second drone age.
The response to to those targeted killings through the use of drones has been unfortunately largely muted both domestically and internationally.
Internationally, the Security Council is largely missing in action.
In my report I cite the fact that since over the last 40 to 50 years, the Security Council has only spoken in 110th of the cases involving claims of self defence and States.
Member States are largely silent when it comes to the use of drones for the purpose of targeted killings in a third country.
They are practical reason to their silence, but they are also other reasons such as fear, diplomatic and political considerations.
The silence of state, the silence of Security Council should have no legal meaning.
But unfortunately a number of states have used that silence to suggest consent to the legal gymnastics and legal distortion I have mentioned before.
So the silence, even though it has no legal meaning as a political cost.
And that's also what we are confronting at the moment in in conclusion, in my report, I'm therefore calling for a very robust measures to be taken in response to the use, the multiplication, the proliferation, the development and the export of use and of drones and the use of force.
I am have called on domestic institution, parliament and the judicial sector to respond to that challenge.
Thus far they are really out of the picture largely.
And I'm also calling on the international community to act towards the development and adoption of robust standard for the control on on drones.
I believe there are a number of opportunities internationally at the moment include the Secretary General protection of civilian strategy.
It includes the development of a political statement on the use of explosive weapons in civilian territories.
And I think there is an increasing awareness, particularly after the strike against General Soleimani, that we we've got to stop.
We cannot proceed, we cannot pursue this line of, of behaviour.
So I'm hoping that states will hear my call and take their responsibilities and produce and implement the standards that are required for the protection of, of human rights as well as more generally, peace and security.
Thank you and yes very much.
And now we turn to questions.
So we'll start if anyone in the room.
Go ahead, Madame Calamar.
Human Rights Council and Human Rights Security.
Yeah, thank you very much for for the question.
Look, I, I am absolutely not a naive expert.
So it is not the the, the, the, the, the required outcome is not going to happen overnight.
There are a number of steps that must be taken and we have to take those steps in a very difficult context of armament race.
The first step to me are for the Security Council to discuss any claims of self defence and any known instance of targeted killings using drones, something they haven't done so far.
I fully adopt and fully support the proposal from the Mexican government to establish an Article 51 forum in New York at the UN so that governments could discuss every claims to self defence in a in a in a way that is not defensive and that does not attach a political price to whatever they may say or do.
We need that coin of debate.
We need open debate domestically and internationally over the so-called decapitation strategy.
Here they concern non state actors, but in that case it was also applied to to a state official.
There is no transparent expert debate as to the cost of such a strategy, its impact, while it may disrupt the working of some groups, What this is a long term vision behind the so-called decapitation strategy.
I want to see debates happening in parliament, in the media and expert debate.
We need far more transparency over the use of drones.
We need a yearly reports from all countries that are currently using force through drones.
There must be a mandatory requirement that they report on how they've used the drones, where they used it and what has been the outcome in terms of casualties.
Those casualties must be must be investigated in a transparent and impartial fashion.
There must be remedies for the victims.
And finally, as I have already said, we also need the development of standard regarding the the use and the export of drones.
Ideally, those standards should be driven by AUN mandated process.
If that is not possible, and it is very likely that this will not be possible, I have suggested a Plan B which would be for willing State to come together, create a process with expert academics, military officials and so on to develop those standards for consideration eventually by the international community.
Other steps must be taken by justice sector.
At the moment no courts around the world, with a few exception, is willing to consider a case of targeted killing using drones.
They consider that as outside their jurisdiction.
They consider that as falling within the the prerogative of governments and because it is extraterritorial, they claim they have no jurisdictions.
So there is a complete gap in terms of judicial review that needs to stop.
It has happened recently with the German court saying actually we do have jurisdiction and we do have oversight over the use of German territory by the US to launch their own drones.
But that is an exceptional case.
What I would like to see is more courts, more judges, being courageous enough to say in view of the development, in view of the cost for our democracy and for human rights, we have jurisdiction over these situations.
And finally, it is essential that Parliament around the world take a much more active role in reviewing those these use of drones.
And yes, we'll go online.
We have a question from Lisa Schlein, the Voice of America.
If we can unmute, Lisa, please.
Yeah, Yes, I've, I've become very good about unmuting myself.
I've got a couple of questions.
Miss Calamar, you mentioned in your report that or I think about a dozen or other countries have also conducted targeted killings.
Now I'm wondering under what circumstances were these killings carried out and under and what explanations, if any were given?
Did any of them also claim self defence like the United States or is the United States the the first and only country to have done so?
And then the second question is, have you received an A response from the United States regarding your your report?
I'm sure they're not too happy about it.
So regarding the targeted killings by by a number of states in my report I do cite I think a dozen states that have used drones for the purpose of use of force.
They are doing so the targeted killings through drones is being done both extraterritorially and and domestically in the context of, for instance, a known non international armed conflict, such as in Nigeria, for instance, drones have been used to target Boko Haram.
So no, here the the, it's part of the international part of the implementation of the of humanitarian law.
And I have not studied the lawfulness of those strikes.
I'm just making the point that there is no claim of self defence in in all cases.
The most well known case where self defence is being used by reference to the legal distortion I have pointed out earlier, which is a legal distortion regarding the imminence of a strike and the sovereignty of the country where the strike is taking place.
The one country that has adopted quite fully the the US doctrine is Turkey.
However, other countries have expressed their support to that doctrine, including the UK, United Kingdom, for instance.
And I, I, you know, I, I believe that they probably have implemented it themselves, but the known cases are mostly related to, to the US.
And sorry, what was your second question?
So, you know, in terms of the process that I have followed my, my report was finished probably first or second week of May.
I have submitted it to every country that is mentioned in the report, which means quite a number of countries.
Usually as per the protocol, they have three weeks to review the section of the report that may relate to to them.
In fact, I because of the, because of the context of COVID-19 and because of the.
The nature of the report, I actually gave them five weeks, which explained the delay in making the report public.
Unfortunately, the US has not engaged with me and has not responded to my report during those five weeks and so far I have not heard any any response yet.
And yes, Lisa, did you have a follow up?
I see your hand is still up.
Can we unmute Lisa to check on that?
Yeah, that, that was mainly it.
I wanted to get a response about that, that I was wondering as long as I have voice, whether is there any there has been no other indication from the United States that it was going to follow through on a similar pattern of targeted killings such as this or you think you think that the criticism that received me and something.
Yeah, that's that's you know, I don't know, but I am following very closely how they are, whether they are imposing the so-called terrorist definition or determination to a state or quasi state entity.
And if I wear those, I will be very careful.
You know, that was the first step for the United States, I think, towards the actual targeted killing of General Soleimani.
The determination I believe in April 2019 that the Revolutionary Guard General Soleimani where where terrorists or fell within their definition, one of their definition of of terrorism and that opened the way or opened the door to using a counterterrorism framework and the War on Terror legal framework to the targeting of General Soleimani.
So my response to you is that if I were in the in the shoes of a government or a member of a government who will be deemed a terrorist by the US at this point, I will be very and extra careful.
And just we'll take questions from colleagues in the room.
We'll start with Peter and then Nick.
Peter Kenny, I work for Anadulu Agency.
I I don't hear you very well.
I work for Anadulu agency.
You mentioned that in the Security Council.
You mentioned the word fear.
So is this fear by States and what states?
Can you elaborate on that please?
So in the context of, you know, when, whenever drones have been used in a public way and including for the purpose of targeted killings, there are often situations where states may state something.
A number of studies have been done and in my report I cite 2, in particular 2 extensive studies done of how state have responded to those targeted killings.
In fact, I cite 3 extensive studies.
In general, the most common response of the state is a very non committed response.
So it's very difficult to determine what is actually being said.
According to the studies that have been done, which has involved speaking with states, a number of them will explain that they'd rather maybe speak in private rather than publicly.
And a large number will say that even though they will want to take a public position against the misuse of self defence, they fear that doing so will carry a political cost for them on the part of the country that has used the claim of self defence for retaliation purposes.
Whether it it's a new diplomatic setting in a political setting, in a financial setting, in an economic setting, so that it is a reality of international relations that not while in theory all member states are equal, in practise some are more equal than others and they impose their ways.
So I don't think it is particularly specific to that particular context of of drones.
Some, some states will not speak because, you know, they may have an ongoing economic relationship or they may seek the, the support of that state for for another purpose.
I mean, it's part of the of, you know, I, I'm not necessarily judging that actually, I'm not naive to think that, you know, everyone should speak their mind and doesn't matter for the cost.
The point I'm making in the report is that because of that, we cannot attribute a legal meaning to what they are saying, because it is not the the laws regarding what has a legal meaning under international law are very strict.
They are very developed and it is very clear that anything being done because of political motivation outside a genuinely held legal belief does not carry a legal meaning under international law.
And So what I am resisting, what I am insisting in the report, is that whenever states do not speak or whenever they speak in ways that is really not very meaningful, we do not suggest that they are consenting to what has been done.
Legally speaking, you cannot reach that conclusion, even though some governments are trying to suggest not only that they have the political support but that they also have a legal mandate.
Because of those silences or because of those muted responses.
That's what I am denouncing.
There is no legal meaning that can be attributed to those statements.
Now we'll take a question from Nick, New York Times here on the left.
You say in the report that the international community risks falling off a Cliff.
Could you just explain what you share?
If the international community falls off this Cliff, what what's going to happen next?
And secondly, do you think the United States should face legal consequences for what happened in January the 3rd?
So what Cliff am I talking about?
The the, the, the risk with the January 3rd strike is that it becomes a precedent.
That to me is the main risk.
The main risk is that governments may elect to target official representative of another country and argue that they are doing so for the purpose of self defence, a self defence defined in a very elastic fashion in the same fashion we have seen in the case of General Soleimani.
That to me is a Cliff in the sense that if you have a few more countries moving into that direction, the, you know, the risk, the real risk of global conflagration are becoming very **** and there will be no red lines really.
Other other reasons to raise the notion of a Cliff is the fact that our whoever and whoever is being targeted, we are still confronting the fact that this is a weapon that is unregulated.
Yes, during the interactive dialogue, every state, so many states have insisted it was a legal weapon.
Nobody is denying that it is a legal weapon.
But every, you know, legal weapons are regulated.
They are regulated domestically or they are regulated internationally, or they are regulated both.
In the case of drones, it is not the case.
They, they don't, they, they, they are usually considered as counterterrorism tools or weapons.
They are not really associated with a military arsenal.
They do not involve the deployment of troops, so for all those reasons they are largely unregulated and unscrutinised, and that's a Cliff because of the technology called Proness attached to them.
I did not raise in that particular report the risk of those drones becoming increasingly able to act without any kind of human intervention.
But that certainly is, you know, one of the next steps we have seen also they are technological developments with regard to the use of drones which will make them extremely difficult to to see, to respond to them.
They may they may act in groups.
And one of the most interesting, I don't know if that's the right term, but drones may be able to communicate with one another outside human intervention and to act on the basis of information that each drone will be giving to another drone.
So the it's me explaining in later what's happening and and the fact that this is unregulated is extremely scary.
The fact that it's actually not the export is not regulated, which means that there are no guarantees attached to it.
It means that if a country decide to use drones for the purpose of targeted killing domestically, how are we going to stop it?
And of course, drones can be used for a range of other purposes which are also contravening international human rights law, including surveillance.
And we've seen the drones being used or tested during COVID-19 or during the protest around the world in over the last months.
So Manycliffe, we are looking at Manycliffe as to the legal consequence for, for the US, you know, the Iran has initiated something.
Iran of course is a plaguant but it is also is a plaintiff but it is also a perpetrator.
Iran has retaliated and has not even argued that they were doing that for self defence in their own letter to the Security Council for the strikes of January 8.
They certainly did not suggest that they were responding to an imminent ******.
They too have gone completely outside the scope of what is permissible under Article 51 and UN Charter.
So, you know, unfortunately, in this world of ours, when it comes to drones and targeted killings, it is very difficult to see which country is more likely to have legitimacy to raise any claims.
In my opinion, when it comes to General Soleimani, it's Iraq.
But Iraq, you know, even though it did raise its claim at the Security Council, did not follow that up very forcefully.
There are a number of consideration taking place here.
You know, the victims should be driving this process, whether they are, you know, General Soleimani's families or others and indeed victims of collateral damage in in different kind of of strikes.
To me, this is what I would privilege.
I want to privilege the the focus on the the victims and their families rather than on the state at this point.
And I am suggesting that the best, most effective response we can give to what has happened is the setting of robust standard and ensuring that this strike does not set a precedent, but is the first and only time when a state target a state official outside a known armed conflict and on the territory of a third country.
We'll go to online and then to Byron.
We have a question from Gabriella Sotomayor of El Proceso of Mexico.
Sorry, Gabriella, if you are unmuted, go ahead please.
And if you can elaborate a little bit on the proposal of Mexico and explain a little bit more more about it and if you think that other states are going to support it.
And then I have another question, if may I, it's not about the report, but it's on another report.
If you have comments on on the Khashoggi's case, if the world has forgotten about that ****** or what, what, what can you say about that?
The proposal of Mexico is very interesting.
First of all, one of the legal officer of the Mexico Mission in New York has written over the last year about the fact that the the the delegations in New York are largely unaware whenever an Article 51 claims is being lodged with article with the Security Council.
In that article, which I will invite you to read, the legal officers highlight all the difficulties that a country such as Mexico confront when trying to get to the bottom of what's happening around the invocation of self defence.
And that led him and his his mission more generally to suggest that there needed to be an open forum to discuss Article 51 claims, a forum where countries could share information, share views, seek expert opinions and advice, and possibly therefore put forward far more informed position on the matter.
I think it's an important proposal.
Based on, on my discussion in New York, I will say that it is a proposal that has a fair amount of support, particularly among countries that do not use drones and particularly among countries in the Global South as well as smaller countries.
So I, I do hope that the Mexico government will feel empowered enough to proceed with, with its initiative when it comes to to Mr the killing of Jamal Khashoggi.
I was in Turkey just, I just came back on on Saturday.
I attended the first day of the trial in absentia.
I believe that this is an important step, notwithstanding the limitation that we are well that I am aware of in terms of the Turkish judicial system, at least that trial is giving the victims, including Attiche Sangis and the Friends of Jamal Khashoggi, a, a space, A platform, which is a formal platform.
It's not the media, it's not me, but it's a formal platform.
It's a recognition by the judicial system that they are plaintiff and that they must be listened to.
So it's, it's very important.
It's important for the integrity of the Turkish investigation that it is now being confronted by judges, that and the international community can be made aware of what they've actually collected and they can assess the evidence provided by Turkey.
I think it's important for the legitimacy of what they have done.
I think it's important because we cannot be held hostage by the Saudi process, which presented more than just a few limitations, but where, in my view, a parody of justice.
The Turkish process has its own limitation, beginning with the fact that it it is in absentia.
But it is fairer than what has happened in Saudi Arabia to date.
It is also allowing for the issue not to fall off the agenda.
It is allowing for international law and domestic law to be given a say over the killing of of Jamal Khashoggi.
I'm hoping that through that process two things are going to happen.
1 other countries are going to see that actually they could maybe proceed by using the principle of universal jurisdiction to to charge Saudi individuals that may come on their territories and to the trial in absentia may empower political decision makers to act on their words.
We've had a lot of good message after the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, the, you know, incredibly violent, obscene killing of General of.
Jamal Khashoggi I'm hoping that the trial is going to give more capacities, more elements, more evidence to politicians around the world to actually bring and continue the fact for accountability.
We'll turn back, I think maybe a few more minutes for questions.
It's good to see you Kalamat.
As you mentioned you were in Istanbul last week in Istanbul courthouse and you talked to journalist and you said that Turkey is doing its part to bring just a force laying journalist Khashoggi.
However, ****** of Khashoggi seems to have fallen off world's agenda right now.
People not anymore talking or it's not anymore in the agenda.
So my question is that will you have a new fresh call to US, Al Saud Arabia, especially Saud Arabia and United States to bring justice for then?
Are you hopeful for accountability?
You know, I will, I will challenge you on the notion that the ****** has fallen off in on Friday there were almost every large media represented represented on on outside the court.
So I don't think the media have forgotten about their friends.
I don't think the media have forgotten that Jamal Khashoggi was dismembered and that his body has disappeared and that this was done by 15 state representative upon the order of very **** level officials.
I don't think the media has forgotten.
I don't think civil society has forgotten.
Our governments more than willing to forget, absolutely.
But This is why you are there.
This is why I am here to keep and insisting that this cannot be forgotten.
So that's the first thing.
Second, is accountability in the formal sense of the word possible for Jamal Khashoggi.
If what you have in mind is Saud Al Kitani and the Crown Prince sitting in a court of law and facing the Attiche Sanghis and facing judges, I think that's a **** call.
I think this kind of outcome is unlikely to take place immediately.
And this kind of outcome, if we take the example of, let's say, Latin America of General Pinochet, takes a great deal of time and usually require something that we call regime change and which is completely outside what I am calling for.
But in the meantime, we have things we can do.
We have a lot of things we can do, A.
We can keep talking about the story.
We can ensure that at every step Saudi Arabia is taking, MBS is taking that the name of Jamal Khashoggi along with the name of all those that are languishing in prison and being tortured, that every step they take, those names are there say their names.
That applies in their case as well, and it applies to us.
There must be a political cost attached to the killing of a journalist.
If we cannot get to the legal cost, we must have a political cost.
And that is not the role of governments as much as it, it is ours as well.
We have we have a lot of power in our hands to to ensure that this political cost is is given.
And there are many other things that can be done.
We can build on the findings of the killing of Jamal Khashoggi.
We can use the you know, the killing of Jamal Khashoggi has highlighted many limitations in the way the international community is able to respond to those killings.
That to me is an excellent platform from which to build better institution, better mechanisms and better responses for all the journalists in the world.
So that is also part of seeking justice for Jamal.
This is something I continue to do.
We will be hammering those demands in the weeks and months leading to the G20.
There is no doubt they will be there during the G20.
And I'm really, really hoping that governments will not repeat this obscene photo about hope that they they did in Osaka, grabbing MBS with big miles and waving to to the international community.
We must remind them that this photo is is a slap in the face of all those who fight for and against violence against journalists.
And it is unconscionable to repeat that in in Riyadh.
And I think we can end on that note.
Thank you, journalists, for joining us here at the Pele and online.
And to you, Miss Calamar, as well, thank you.