OHCHR Press Conference - Special Rapporteur Ben Saul on Human Rights and Counterterrorism
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Press Conferences | OHCHR

OHCHR Press Conference - Special Rapporteur Ben Saul on Human Rights and Counterterrorism

Vision and priorities of the newly appointed Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Saul

 

Speaker:  

  • Ben Saul, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
Teleprompter
Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to this press conference.
Today we have with us Mr Bensall, who is a Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism.
We will begin with opening remarks from the special rapporteur, after which we will begin and open up the floor to questions.
With that, I hand over to Mr Osso.
Thank you very much and I'm delighted to launch my first report as Special Rapporteur before the Human Rights Council today.
Regrettably, my reports documents that the past two decades of prolific global counterterrorism efforts have not been matched by an equally robust commitment to human rights.
Counterterrorism measures are strewn with human rights violations, including unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, torture, unfair trial, privacy breaches from mass surveillance, and the criminalisation of freedoms of expression, assembly, association and political participation.
The this misuse of counterterrorism measures not only violates the rights of suspected criminals but can also jeopardise the rights of the innocent.
In many places, there has been a rampant weaponization of overly broad terrorism definitions and offences against civil society, against human rights defenders, activists, political opponents, journalists, minorities, and students.
Counterterrorism financing measures have restricted legitimate nonprofit activities and impeded humanitarian relief.
Unjustified states of emergency continue to undermine human rights.
Excessive military violence in response to terrorism also destroys human rights, including through violations of international humanitarian law and International Criminal law.
States use violence across borders, even when it is not justified under the international law of self defence.
Many states have also failed to seriously address the root causes of terrorism, including the state's own violations of human rights, and impunity for these state violations is endemic and is driving more grievance and more violence.
My first report today announces my priorities over the next three years.
These include ensuring that regional organisations respect human rights when countering terrorism.
That coercive administrative measures to prevent terrorism comply with human rights.
That non state actors involved in counterterrorism respect human rights, including technology, finance, security companies, armed groups and non profits.
That new technologies to counterterrorism are effectively regulated, including spyware, facial recognition, artificial intelligence.
I'm keen to ensure that states are held accountable for large scale violations of human rights resulting from counter terrorism.
And then finally that victims of terrorism also receive full and effective remedies.
Over the next three years, I'll also continue the efforts of my predecessor on preventing the ***** of counter terrorism against civil society, protecting the 70,000 people still arbitrarily detained in northeast Syria in the context of the the war against Islamic State, protecting detainees and transferees from detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and ensuring that the United Nations itself, through all of its counterterrorism bodies and other agencies, safeguards human rights in its counterterrorism work.
So in the current climate, human rights in counterterrorism are at increased risk because of rising authoritarianism, surging domestic polarisation and extremism, geopolitical competition, dysfunction in the Security Council and new tools, including social media, for fuelling dehumanisation, vilification, incitement and misinformation.
Double standards by major powers in the enforcement of human rights is also eroding public confidence in the credibility of the international system.
States also must do better in funding the protection of human rights in counterterrorism.
So my message, in conclusion is to urge all states to move beyond the dominant rhetorical commitment to human rights and to instead place them at the heart of all of their counterterrorism measures.
Respecting human rights not only makes counterterrorism more legitimate, it also makes it more effective because publics have confidence that states are using their counterterrorism measures in accordance with law and with full respect for all individuals affected.
[Other language spoken]
Thank you, Mr So the special operator will now take questions.
Please state your name and the outlet you work for before asking your question.
We'll begin with the questions from the room and then move on to those of you joining us online.
[Other language spoken]
I see no hands on in the room, so we'll start with the Yuri Aprelev from RIA Novosti online.
[Other language spoken]
Yes, and thank you for taking my question and thank you for this briefing.
[Other language spoken]
The first one is about what you say just now that the double standards of the great powers with regard to the application of human rights award confidence in international law.
What countries are you talking about exactly?
Because this is not something which great great powers to be more clearly are you talking about.
In your report, you mentioned the fact that the place of the USA in the world has allowed them to seriously violate international law without consequences for them.
Is this the kind of double standards?
[Other language spoken]
Can we say that after September 11, the United States interpreted the very principle of international law in its war against terrorism still in force today, withdrawn strikes against surveillance states without any mandate from the Security Council, Numerous civilians casualties following these strikes and the occupation of territories are still today in Syria and Iraq.
And do you think that the situation in Gaza today is the consequences of the US policy which the US is also covering in the security conceal because Israel is saying that the war in Gaza is against the terroristic organisation?
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
So this is a thematic report.
So it's not a report about the performance of any particular countries.
So it's a more general observation about what's happened I think over the last 20 years in terms of countering terrorism.
I wouldn't say it's limited to any particular great power.
I mean I think we've seen behaviour by, by a large number of powerful states, including members, all members frankly of the Security Council who over over time have not respected human rights in their, in their operations.
That includes their, their foreign military operations against terrorism.
It includes domestic legal measures to counter terrorism through regular law enforcement and and so on.
But the point about all of this is that it does fuel further polarisation and discontent because certain states are seen to be thwarting the the will of the majority of the international community to to to to to implement and enforce international law.
5 states on the Security Council have a veto right.
So they have the capacity to do good in using their power under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to prevent situations involving terrorism or or other violence from from escalating.
Or they can exercise their vetoes to, to stop international action.
And there are so many examples of that, not only in a, in a, in a, in a counter terrorism context in relation to to Gaza.
Look, I and other special rapporteurs have consistently called on all parties in that conflict to respect international humanitarian law, international human rights law and International Criminal law.
It's clear that on October 7 and subsequently, there were very grave violations of international law by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups.
That continues today in the form of ongoing hostage taking as well as occasional rocket fire after September 11th, indiscriminate, not targeting military objectives likely to strike civilians and therefore constitute war crimes.
The Israeli response, of course, has has also not complied with its obligations under international humanitarian law.
Now, we've consistently highlighted that Israel has not exercised the the level of care in the protection of civilians required by international humanitarian law.
That's manifest in at a minimum, disproportionate attacks which cause excessive civilian casualties relative to the military advantage, indiscriminate attacks which don't sufficiently differentiate between military targets and civilians through, for example, the the dropping of very large unguided munitions in densely populated urban areas and and large numbers of the munitions, a large proportion of the of the munitions used by Israel have fallen into that into that category.
Failure to to warn civilians, denial of humanitarian relief, consequential likely starvation of the of the civilian population, arbitrary forced displacement, not providing the necessary humanitarian conditions during displacement.
So look there, there have been lots of very well documented violations by Israel.
That's not to say that all of Israel's violence is is is unlawful.
And certainly Israel has been taking certain steps in the targeting process and, and seeking legal advice and so on.
But the overwhelming impression is that these are not isolated cases of violations, but there is a kind of systematic non compliance in relation to both the protection of civilians in the conduct of hostilities, so in in in targeting, but also in the denial of humanitarian relief necessary to sustain over 2 what 2.3 million people in Gaza, many of whom have been forced to to the verge of of starvation.
[Other language spoken]
So we'll take the next question from Mr Antonio Brotto from FA.
[Other language spoken]
Thank you very much.
[Other language spoken]
On the use of anti.
Progress legislation to arrest the political dissidency in in some countries and if you can give some.
Examples of that.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
So my predecessor wrote a major global study on the misuse of counterterrorism laws against civil society.
So she found that it's it's, it's not an issue confined to a particular or small number of countries.
This is something which is endemic in in many parts of the world and it encompasses, you know, a broad range of civil society.
[Other language spoken]
It's act, you know, climate activists or human rights defenders or students or or in some cases lawyers and even even judges.
It's the use of counterterrorism financing laws to shut down or restrict the lawful operation of of non government organisations of all kinds, religious, charitable, humanitarian, etcetera.
So we issue individual communications and we have on the United Nations human rights database a long list of precisely these kinds of cases where counter and laws have have been abused against all all kinds of of of different categories.
In my dialogue with states this morning, for example, the case of Tunisia came up where, you know, emergency laws and decrees in Tunisia have been used essentially to sack judges and in pursue charges and imprisonment against judges for, for just doing their, you know, their, their job as officers of, of the, of, of the court.
And these, these are kind of sackings on a mass basis, large numbers of, of people subject to these kinds of legal proceedings.
So there are look, there are, there are so many of these cases that this is this is precisely why it's so, so alarming because there there isn't any kind of concerted push back from the international community to bring pressure to bear on these states to reverse this, this kind of misuse.
The messaging from from much of the international community has been states must be tough on, on terrorists and repress, repress terrorism.
But I think the pendulum has swung much too far in favour of repression without sufficiently balancing the protection of human rights by state officials.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
My name is Catherine Film Combo Conga.
French International TV, in the list of people you mentioned that have been victims of the misuse of counterterrorism, I think you forgot journalists.
So I'd like to hear a bit more on on that issue, particularly as you know, in the context of September 11th, everything started that in the name of conducting infighting terrorism, state started to conduct surveillance on journalists, wiretapping journalists, monitoring journalists and also arresting individuals.
So what do you have to say on that?
And also if you could highlight a little bit more the aspects in European countries.
Yes, so look, I, I do mention journalists in, in my report and I think I did mention it in, in opening remarks as well.
It it's, that's a very important category that has come under pressure from counter terrorism laws.
You know, in the dialogue this morning, the the case of Jimmy Lai came up, for example, a proprietor of a major independent news outlet in Hong Kong, China, who has been arrested and charged on national security, national security offences essentially as a way of, of shutting down the operation of, of the independent media.
So this is, you know, this is not an uncommon occurrence.
You mentioned spyware and of course that's been a, a great concern in, in many countries this, you know, secret use of, of spyware to which you know, through tracking journalists and so on can can expose sources and lead to reprisals against those sources as well.
One of the one of the problems is a lack of effective international and national regulation of these kinds of technologies, coupled with, you know, private companies who who make this software, make, make these programmes themselves.
Not being very good at doing, you know, human rights due diligence in the kinds of kinds of products that they produce and, and sell to, to, to, to different actors around the world.
So we, you know, my man and dad is, is very focused on trying to come up with options for stronger international regulation of those kinds of new technologies which are routinely used against, against journalists.
You know, in some situations, of course, there's been the direct targeting of journalists.
So, you know, certain countries are, are, are well known for having, for being very dangerous places for, for journalists.
And that's not just in active conflict zones.
You know, we, we have seen certain states seemingly deliberately targeting media workers, including in, in recent conflict.
And then of course, you know, censorship and online moderation.
I mean, there are lots of interferences with the freedom of the media to report on its on on, on on all kinds of matters of public affairs because of restrictions on on extremist speech or, or or praising, glorifying, advocating terrorism, etcetera.
[Other language spoken]
I'd also mentioned non traditional media SO1 case, which of course has has been of concern in the media is, is the case of Julian Assange.
And that's a case which you know, the the the WikiLeaks publisher.
That's a case which my mandate is watching closely as as that trial moves moves closer in, in the current extradition proceeding between the UK and the US.
[Other language spoken]
We have a question in the room.
[Other language spoken]
I have a question that you know the hot topic it was after 911 during the 10 years the on the issue counter terrorist was still on the hot topic.
But why now you launch this kind of report?
Is that a good moment?
[Other language spoken]
Sorry, I'm not, I'm not.
[Other language spoken]
I'm not, I'm not quite sure what you're asking the the timing.
What's the timing to launch your report now?
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
So, well, to, to explain.
I've just been appointed, so it's my job to to write, write reports.
And I, I write 2A year.
So one to the Human Rights Council, 1 to the General Assembly.
And so that's, that explains the, the, the, the, the, the timing.
I think though, it's, it's also quite a useful moment to reflect on the last two decades right, of counterterrorism law.
I mean, initially after 9-11, there was a huge rush to make legislation.
There was then a kind of second wave after ISIS emerged in 20/12/13 and new issues like foreign fighters emerged.
And, you know, people often thought after these kind of initial tranches of legislative activism, things would kind of settle down.
And if if countries went too far, that laws would be would be dialled back.
I don't think that's happened in in many parts of the world.
I mean, I think what we have seen is the security, UN Security Council has been constantly pushing states to adopt new counterterrorism measures consistently over the the last two decades.
And, and so, you know, more and more measures are piled on at the at the national level.
And that happens regardless.
So, so the Security Council requires all countries to to adopt these these counter areas and measures, regardless of whether a particular country has an effective rule of law system, whether it has an independent judiciary, whether it respects and safeguards human rights.
And I think that's actually an incredibly dangerous thing for the United Nations to keep doing when there's no international internationally agreed definition of terrorism.
The, the, the, the UN counterterrorism bodies are continuing to require states to, to adopt laws regardless of their history of misusing existing counterterrorism laws and regardless of often a dire lack of effective human rights safeguards to control those measures and push back against them.
And, and to ensure that the state's use of those powers, the state can be held accountable for, for those kinds of misuses.
We've then seen in addition to terrorism, this new concept of violent extremism being used as well in many countries.
[Other language spoken]
And yet the UN is requiring states to take measures to respond to to those as well.
And it's, you know, in a perfect world, if, if a state has a great human rights and, and rule of law system, then, you know, maybe counter terrorism laws would would work in a manner consistent with with human rights.
But that's not the world that that's not the world in, in, in most parts of it.
What in in certainly a majority of countries around the world and even those countries with really effective legal systems still have serious human rights compliance problems in in relation to to counter terrorism.
So I do think it's been, although the Security Council has paid more attention to human rights over over the years, it has often been fairly rhetorical and it hasn't been matched by specific requirements on states to do certain things to protect human rights or the funding of human rights in that process of of countering terrorism.
[Other language spoken]
Mr So there's a follow up question online from Miss Catherine Piankong Bukonga.
Yes, thank you for giving me the floor again, Sir.
I'd like you to come back on, on, on please what you said you mentioned previously to my question.
I'd like to see a little bit more what you the recommendations that you've formulated towards I would say Europe and European countries because P5 are often under the spotlight and other specific countries that are in conflict.
But for instance, in France, we had some journalists that have been taped followed in the name of state security.
What kind of recommendation have you mentioned?
And also what about your cooperation with the EU or with parliamentaries?
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
Thank you for the the question.
And, and, and look, just to clarify, this report is my, so I've been in the job three months and the, the, the first report is always setting out priorities for the next three years.
So this report itself does not yet have recommendations on any particular issues.
It's, it's more scoping what I'm what I'm going to do as the, as the job gets going over the over the next three years.
So it is, it is a little bit early to have recommendations on, on any substantive issues.
Having said that, we of course one part of the the the role of a special rapporteur is to receive and address what we call individual communications to to states.
They can be complaints we receive from victims of state violations of human rights or they can be assessments we conduct of counter terrorism laws, policies, practises in a in a particular government in a particular country.
So that's in part a reactive process of people in France want to bring complaints to the office, they're welcome to do that.
And and that's then the context in which we can engage with the state.
Or if there's, let's say new legislation or old legislation which is being used problematically in a, in a new way, then we can also take that up with with the particular country.
So would absolutely encourage you if if you have concerns about the treatment of journalists in France, for example, or, or in other European countries, then that would be the the usual way in which we would address those issues in terms of the EU, yes.
So my my first report to the General Assembly in October will be about the role of regional organisations in countering terrorism and the extent to which they respect human rights in the kinds of measures, laws, etcetera, that they adopt.
So the EU and the Council of Europe, you know, other other two as well as OSCE, our bodies in Europe, which we will be looking at closely in that context to assess how well they've been doing in, in respecting human rights.
It'll also cover regional organisations from all kinds of other regions around the world as well.
In terms of Parliament, yeah, I mean, we would engage parliaments in the context usually of draught legislation or new bills.
So if we're concerned about the development of, you know, particular new legislation, a good example is the Hong Kong National Security Law, which is in draught form at the moment.
Then that's a kind of point at which we could make a submission or, or brief parliamentarians.
I mean, today, for example, I'm I'm briefing parliamentarians in the United Kingdom about UK arms transfers to Israel in relation to the war in Gaza.
Because we we have taken a position that we think continuing to export weapons and ammunition to Israel, given the clear risk of the use of those weapons in violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza, means that states exporting those weapons would themselves be violating their duty under international humanitarian law to ensure respect for humanitarian law by other states.
And that means by not exporting arms to them, which would enable further violations to take place.
So yes, we dialogue with parliamentarians and we engage formally on on legislative proposals as well.
[Other language spoken]
There's a question from Mr.
[Other language spoken]
Yes, good afternoon.
Asking this question for one of my outlets, The Lancet, the medical journal.
I was wondering, Professor, in your research, have you come across situations where Member States have very good legislation on their statutes concerning counter terrorism and etcetera, and at the same time they're exporting mechanisms that are used to torture people that are alleged to fall into the category of extremists or alleged terrorists?
[Other language spoken]
So just to clarify the question, so exporting by exporting, you mean like deporting or or extraditing people to other countries to be tortured?
Is is that the question?
Wait, yeah, no exporting equipment that is used for torture.
In a lot of the cases, there's not much transparency on the charges.
They're Incognito.
They're in so-called black sites etcetera.
So on the one hand there's very good legislation on the torture convention, but at the same time you've got parallel universe.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
And, and, and look, certainly the, the bigger issue of rendition of torture of terrorism suspects to other countries has been well covered by the by the mandate in the in the past.
But, but on the, the key part of your question, I'd, I'd refer you to my colleague, the special rapporteur on torture, who released her thematic report last week at the Human Rights Council, which was precisely devoted to this question of torture equipment, material, All the different, the different things, tools which states export to one another in a, in a law enforcement context, in which can be used in, in torture or cruel in human degrading treatment, other I'll treatment in, in detention.
So that's the that's the the the most up to date source of, of thinking about about that question.
[Other language spoken]
Now we have a question from Mr Nick coming Bruce from the New York.
Yeah, thank you for taking this question.
You talked about the strong drift away from human rights and counterterrorism practise internationally.
I wondered what's your view of the role?
Of the UN counterterrorism mechanisms and this might.
[Other language spoken]
Exponentially in recent years, largely with the support of governments that have a bad human rights.
[Other language spoken]
You think it's been instrumentalized?
By them to kind of help shift essentially the the standard.
Of of cancer and.
Practise away from human rights.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
And, and yes, absolutely the counterterrorism mechanisms have grown enormously in recent years.
I mean, they used to be the, the Security Council sanctions committees, plus the Counterterrorism Executive Directorate and, and counterterrorism committee monitoring implementation of the Security Council resolutions.
But then in 2017 the UN Office of Counterterrorism was added and has grown exponentially as as you say.
And then of course, UN Office of Drugs and Crime has always been there in, in Vienna.
But also this, this other mechanism of the UN Global Compact on Counterterrorism of of which I'm a member, along with 46 other UN mainly entities and a few, a few others.
And they have a, a bunch of working groups which focus on a whole range of specific issues, lots of technical assistance, capacity building, standard setting being driven by by those, those bodies.
And then of course, the UN Counterterrorism Centre, part of the, the Office of Counterterrorism now as well.
Look, it's on influence of donors.
[Other language spoken]
I mean, yes, by by giving money states, you know, this is in any context, states may feel like they get something out of that in terms of self self-interest, whether that's limited to a kind of, you know, legitimization of, of, of their, you know, positive role in supporting multilateralism or whether they want something more than that.
I, they want to control, you know, operationally the direction of, of what these counter terrorism bodies do, their priorities, etcetera.
I just don't have an, I'm only three months into the job.
I just don't have enough of a sense yet of to what extent when they give this money, they then have control over how it is spent and directed, you know, at the, at the kind of project and, and operational level or whether, you know, the money's given.
And then there's sufficient kind of structural independence within the organisation for the organisation to make up, you know, make up its own mind about, about where those resources are allocated, what kinds of issues are, are are worked on and so on.
I wouldn't say it's, it's, it's an issue limited to to money.
I mean, of course, you know, even if you don't give money, sometimes certain states might have a senior UN official in a top job in one of these, one of these agencies, you know, different countries on a rotating basis chair the counterterrorism committee and therefore have a certain level of control over what those what those bodies do.
So there are lots of points of political influence, you know, in a political politicised multilateral system.
But I think it it's absolutely the right question to ask if a small number of donors is giving the majority of the money in the system that that should always raise questions about who has influence in in the kind of work that those bodies are doing.
[Other language spoken]
Mr Saul, we have a question in the room.
Thank you for taking my question.
Neva Sheva here from Q the news, the Japanese news agency here at the UNI.
Just have a question regarding the situation in Switzerland.
As you know, there were like a terrorist attack in Zurich, consider as a terrorist attack.
So the knife attack on the Orthodox Jew by 15 years old boy, Tunisian and Swiss and and the idea has been raised to RIP hop RIP off its nationality.
So in that case, would you consider that it would be like again, the human rights.
What's your opinion on that case?
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
Yeah, so international law says a few things about this.
I mean, if you know, if it would make a person stateless actually or de facto, then I think that is clearly a problem.
If this boy has a second, you know, nationality at present Tunisia, then look, there are then still other human rights questions about is it well, is it, is it safe to return the person to Tunisia?
What does it mean in terms of impact on family rights if he has an established family here?
And I, I don't know the fact of, of, of this case.
Are there risks of ill treatment, etcetera.
On, on return to Tunisia, knowing what we know about the, the state of the legal system there, which is, you know, I mean, has lost, you know, any kind of semblance of independence, rule of law in the last couple of years because of the, the state of emergency decrees.
There being a child, obviously that you know, that, that what, what's in the best interests of the child plays into that consideration as well.
Is the process for stripping citizenship respectful of, of, of procedural rights, due process, judicial safeguards, etcetera.
And then I mean I would say just on the security front, look, you know it is a discretion of states ultimately.
I mean this is the international law system we have.
It's a discretion of states who they confer nationality on and deprive nationality of.
And as long as it's not done arbitrarily without due process etcetera, then you know it is it is permitted under under international law.
But I would say in terms of the underlying Security question, I do think that if a person has lived in a country for a good period of time, might have, you know, stronger links to the country they're currently in than the one they might have some other nationality of.
Then I do think it it just in terms of effectiveness of prosecution, effectiveness of rehabilitation, you know, reintegration de radicalization or all these kinds of processes.
I mean, it does make security sense in containing whatever risk that person might still pose in the future to do all of that in the country where they have the strongest links, because that's where they'll be supported by, by family.
It's where they, you know, they might have social connections and speak the the language.
And I mean, in this, in this context of citizenship stripping, you know, we have seen lots of cases where people have lived all their life in one country and suddenly because they've got some formal nationality of another country, they're, they're, they're deported to that country where they, you know, they've got no links that that country might not have effective law enforcement.
You know, it might have a, a weak system for, for dealing with the ******.
And, and, you know, I, I do see that as exporting, you know, your security problem to another country that isn't well equipped to deal with that.
So I, I think we should be very careful about about citizen stripping citizenship.
I don't think it's a security solution and often it's not human rights compliant.
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
Thank you very much for taking my question.
[Other language spoken]
Fighting in Gaza.
Fighting the terrorist terrorist group in Gaza.
What is your opinion about that?
And are you considering Hamas like a terrorist organisation?
[Other language spoken]
Thanks for the question.
Look that there is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism, so I don't have an international law basis myself for determining who is or or isn't terrorist.
Hamas is also not on the Security Council's list of terrorist organisations.
Now, having said all of that, of course, what has happened is that the Security Council, as we mentioned, has required all countries to take measures to to prevent and suppress terrorism.
By not adopting a definition, it's then essentially allowed each country around the world to make up its own definition of terrorism and to apply that to two different actors.
And sometimes that's, you know, that that is, is clearly abusive.
Other times it's, it's, you know, it's more difficult to tell, you know, in the, in terms of my mandate, I've got a mandate from the Human Rights Council to monitor state's compliance with human rights whenever they determine that an actor is terrorist.
So I don't have to take a position on whether I think Hamas is, is terrorist or not.
That's that's not relevant to the, the power I've been entrusted with by the United Nations.
But what I can do is as soon as a state calls a group terrorist or classifieds it as terrorist legally, then that engages my role in ensuring that they that that state respects human rights in any of the actions it takes to counter to counter that that group.
So it's a protective function, right.
So even if groups are, you know, are not strictly or genuinely terrorist, you know, there's still a level of international protection of human rights in, in, in that campaign against the group nominated by, by a state.
Look on how much specifically, I mean, the international definition problem, of course, part of that debate still.
And there's a treaty being negotiated in the General Assembly since 2001.
It's been going on for two decades, reflects this ongoing division for the at least the last century between states over issues like, you know, can you call a self determination movement or a liberation movement terrorist or not?
Should terrorism, terrorist offences apply in situations of armed conflict or not?
Or should we just leave that to be regulated by international humanitarian law, war crimes, etcetera?
I mean, what, you know, why is it necessary to call a group or a person terrorist if when they ****** civilians, it's already the war crime of murdering civilians?
Now, some states would say the reason is because terrorism law gives you extra powers, which humanitarian law doesn't give you.
So humanitarian law forbids you from doing certain things.
It makes certain things war crimes, but it doesn't necessarily give you these other powers, you know, to ban an organisation, to criminalise its membership, to crack down on its financing, to exercise all kinds of special investigative and surveillance powers.
So, you know, terrorism law can give you extra staff, which humanitarian law doesn't necessarily give you.
And I point in particular to what we call preparatory terrorism offences.
So in relation to war crimes, you know, if you commit a war crime or you, you know, aid or assist somebody to commit a war crime, you know, that's, that's, that attracts criminal liability.
All of that happens in relation to terrorism as well.
But in addition, terrorism law often also makes an an offence to, you know, finance a terrorist group or to associate with terrorists or to be a member of a terrorist organisation, All things which are generally not offences in respect of war crimes or genocide or, or or other other international crimes.
So on Hamas, look, some states call it terrorists and ban it as terrorists.
Most states in the world have not done that.
Security Council has not listed it.
So the question is, you know, depending on what is the national definition of terrorism in any given country, does what Hamas is doing or has done fit that definition in in national law?
[Other language spoken]
I think Mr Asia has a follow up.
[Other language spoken]
Some organisations and states consider the Israeli attack against civilian in Gaza like the terrorist attack.
How you see that?
[Other language spoken]
What is your opinion about the these accusations?
[Other language spoken]
[Other language spoken]
So as I mentioned that there's no international definition of terrorism.
So we have no international legal standard from terrorism law to apply to what Israel is doing.
Certainly, you know, under international humanitarian law, there's already a very comprehensive legal framework for dealing with violence by any party, state or non state in armed conflict.
So if you know, if for example, a party is deliberately targeting civilians, causing disproportionate civilian casualties, launching indiscriminate attacks which which harm civilians or, you know, deliberately attack civilian infrastructure, you know, buildings, etcetera, and it's not justified as an attack on a military objective, then all of those things are already illegal under international law.
They're already war crimes under, under international law.
So calling it terrorism, I mean, in terms of the, the outcome, it doesn't, doesn't make a legal difference.
It could, it could make a difference in terms of, you know, political labelling, etcetera.
I mean, is it, and then you have to ask the question, you know, is it worse to call someone a terrorist than a, than a war criminal, right.
I mean, you know, people might have different, different views on that.
I think war criminals are pretty bad.
That's already a pretty, you know, it's an international crime.
Terrorism is not an international crime, by the way.
So calling something a crime against humanity, genocide or war crimes is actually the worst thing you can, you can call somebody in terms of the gravity of, of legal accusation.
So terrorism, you know, does doesn't necessarily to add much to that.
Having said that, what I would say is under international humanitarian law, there is actually a specific war crime of intentionally spreading terror amongst a civilian population.
[Other language spoken]
It has been prosecuted in a number of previous contexts.
So Sierra Leone in, in Sarajevo, in, in Bosnia, you know, if a party to an armed conflict deliberately.
So it's already a crime to deliberately attack and **** civilians, but it's also separately an additional crime to deliberately attack civilians for the purpose of inflicting severe psychological suffering, extreme fear, you know, to terrorise them psychologically.
So quite apart from the underlying physical killings, the international community has said it's also a separate wrong which should be recognised in a, in a separate war crime to attack civilians in such a way that you terrorise the, the population as a, as a whole.
So in Sarajevo it was, you know, deliberately targeting, you know, cemeteries and funeral processions and, and cafes and restaurants and public transport and people queuing at, at food or water points and so on to try to intimidate civilians and, and make them feel that resistance on the side of the defenders of the besieged city of Sarajevo is futile and you should, you should give up.
Likewise in Sierra Sierra Leone, it was a campaign by armed groups of deliberate mutilation of civilians, hacking off limbs and sexual violence against women designed to terrorise and and intimidate the civilian population.
So obviously you would need evidence of that in in the case of of Gaza, is Israel just being careless and tolerating, you know, **** levels of civilian casualties, which is already illegal under international law?
Or are they deliberately attacking civilian infrastructure, civilians in order to terrorise the population as a as a whole?
That's not an argument I've seen made legally so far.
I think for the reason I gave earlier that, you know, war crimes, crimes against humanity already comprehensively cover everything that that Israel is accused of doing.
[Other language spoken]
If there are no further questions, we'll now close this press conference.
Thank you very much for joining us.